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Abstract 
 
In recent years both Britain and France have witnessed riots by ethnic minority youth. 
This thesis will conduct a comparative study into the riots which broke out in Oldham 
in 2001 and Lyon in 2005. This is guided by two questions: firstly, why did riots erupt 
in these two cities; and secondly, why was it that Lyon‟s riots were composed of two 
parties (police and ethnic youth) and Oldham‟s riots three parties (police, ethnic youth 
and right wing activists)? This thesis will argue that the role of the police is central to 
answering both questions. Firstly, it will argue that harassment by the police created 
grievances that led to rioting. Secondly, it will argue that the different composition of 
the riots was caused by the nature of the harassment employed by the police, which 
was in turn influenced by the nature of the relationship between the state and the 
police. 
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Introduction 
Over the last thirty years, riots by ethnic minority youth have become a reoccurring 
phenomenon in France and Britain. Recent riots in Tottenham, London and outbursts 
of violence elsewhere across the country, highlight the ongoing nature of the problem 
and make it a problem deserving of attention. 
 
In 2005, riots erupted in nearly 300 cities all around France, where young people of 
North African and African descent clashed violently with authorities over three 
consecutive weeks. Lyon was one of the epicentres of rioting, where violence spread 
from the banlieues to the city centre. Four years earlier in 2001, riots erupted in 
Oldham, Bradford and Burnley in the space of a few weeks, where youths of Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi origin clashed with police, as well as with white youths. In both 
countries, it has not been unusual to put the blame on a lack of integration on part of 
the youth, or on a general loss of respect, manifesting itself in debates about an oath 
of allegiance to Britain (in 2001) or in the threat to revoke French citizenship 
(Sarkozy in 2005).  However, if riots are understood as an expression of grievances, 
they provide an important tool for understanding and analysing deeper societal 
problems, and allow commentators to extend their analysis beyond the rioters 
themselves.  
 
This thesis seeks to add to this latter approach by conducting a comparative study into 
the riots in Oldham (2001) and Lyon (2005) in order to address two key questions: 
Firstly, why is it that riots by ethnic minority youth have erupted in both cities? And 
secondly, why is it that in Lyon, clashes have taken place solely between the youth 
and the police, whereas in Oldham clashes have also taken place with the white 
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community? Whereas a lot of academic analysis has been concerned with the question 
of why riots have erupted in France and Britain in recent years, the second question 
has received considerably less attention. Rather, it is predominantly treated as a side 
effect of the countries‟ two different models of integration – multiculturalism in 
Britain and the „colour-blind‟ French Republican model – where it is argued that 
Britain‟s acknowledgement of different ethnicities increases tension between the 
different groups (Body-Gendrot 2008, Kepel 2010). However, as others have pointed 
out (for example see Murray 2006) racism is equally prevalent in France and as such 
this explanation does not seem sufficient. 
 
This thesis follows a different path, arguing that the role of the police, and the 
relationship it has with the ethnic, as well as the white community is central to 
answering both questions. In turn it will be argued that the respective models of the 
policing in France and Britain have been of primary importance in influencing rioting 
behaviour in the two countries. The French police‟s centralised structure under the 
control of the Interior Minister has largely shielded it from outside criticism, whereas 
Britain‟s decentralised and more independent structure has made it more accountable 
to citizens (Lawday 2000), and involves independent policing initiatives in the 
different divisions, such as the Oldham police force. 
 
Firstly, it will be argued that in both Oldham and Lyon, the actions of the police have 
contributed to the outbreak of riots. In Oldham, the police engaged in non-violent 
forms of harassment, focussing on „Asian on white racism‟ as the main problem and 
ignoring concerns of the Asian community. In Lyon, the police engaged in violent 
forms of harassment, characterized by police brutality and excessive use of force. 
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These different forms of confrontation have been shaped by the relationship between 
the state and police in France and Britain.  
 
Secondly, it will be argued that the different forms of policing also affected the role of 
the white community, in turn affecting riot behaviour by ethnic minority youth in the 
two cities. In Oldham, a non-violent stance by the police had the effect that racist 
elements in the white community were equally dissatisfied, and increasingly took 
matters into their own hands, exacerbating tensions between the different 
communities in Oldham. This is not a general feature in Britain, but is a defining 
feature in Oldham. In Lyon on the other hand, a tough stance by the police against 
ethnic minority youth assured racist groups that the police were „doing their job‟, pre-
empting attacks by white racist groups on the scale as has been seen in Oldham. 
 
In other words, the question of whether French and British societies are more racist 
than each other is secondary to the nature of the relationship between the state and the 
police. The role of the French police as the “protector of the state” (Lawday 2000: 1) 
has shielded it from critique, allowing it to engage in violent forms of harassment; 
Britain‟s police force on the other hand is decentralised, largely independent from 
government and more accountable to British citizens (ibid.). This feature of both 
states not only affects the character of policing, but also affects the character of the 
radical right in both countries and helps explain the presence or absence of these 
forces during riots by ethnic minority youth. Of course there are other factors which 
explain riot behaviour in these two countries, but this aspect is of primary importance. 
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Definitions  
 
An important feature of this thesis is the role of violent versus non-violent forms of 
harassment. Violent forms of harassment involve issue such as police brutality, 
excessive use of force, unreasonable stop searches and a disproportional strong focus 
on policing areas with large immigrant communities. Non-violent harassment on the 
other hand involves issues such as neglect of concerns of ethnic minorities, siding 
with the white community when disputes arise, or blaming immigrant communities 
for high levels of crime. Both are forms of harassment, but the former involves 
violence and a visible stance against minorities on the streets, whereas the latter does 
not.  
 
Another important factor is the different systems of policing in France in Britain, and 
the different relationship with the state. The French police force is centralised and 
under the control of the Interior Minister, whereas the British police force is largely 
independent from government and decentralised (Lawday 2000). As has been pointed 
out by numerous scholars (for example see Body-Gendrot 2010, Zauberman et al 
2003; Lawday 2000), this has had the effect that the French police force is not as 
accountable to the French citizens, it is seen as „the protector of the state‟. Rather, it 
has largely been shielded from critique, which differs from the British police which is 
more accountable to the people (Lawday 2000).  
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Thesis Outline  
  
The first chapter consists of two parts; a review of the literature on the riots in Britain 
and France and an inquiry into the underlying nature of riots. In the second part, 
different understandings of riots will be discussed, including the models of riots as 
irrational, rational or issueless phenomenon. It will be argued that whilst riots may 
take many forms, they can be used as a tool to express grievances by groups. This 
thesis treats the riots in Oldham and Lyon as examples of rational riots expressing 
legitimate grievances. 
  
The second chapter covers the riots in Oldham. What will be shown is that the police 
engaged in a non-violent form of harassment, focusing predominantly on „Asian on 
white racism‟ and neglecting the concerns of the Asian community. In addition, the 
police was seen as being unresponsive to attacks by white racist groups on the Asian 
community. The dynamics in Oldham have to be seen in combination with decisions 
made by the local police force. 
 
The third chapter analyses the outbreak of the riots in Lyon. Here, the conflict 
between police and ethnic minority youth is more straightforward – centring around 
the issues of discrimination, racial stereotyping and excessive use of force. The riots 
in Lyon have to be seen as simply being the most recent example in a long line of 
similar events, caused by an oppressive and static structure made up of police and 
authorities.  
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The fourth chapter will analyse these two case studies in a comparative perspective, 
aiming to answer the question of why in France, clashes have taken place solely 
between the police and the youth, whereas in Oldham ethnic youth also clashed with 
the white community, especially right-wing groups. What will be argued is that racist 
elements within Oldham were equally unsatisfied with the police and their non-
violent stand against the Asian community. In France on the other hand, right-wing 
elements (the FN) were satisfied with the police, instead exercising pressure through 
the political system, predominantly on a national level. As will be shown, the different 
roles of the police system within France and Britain have been highly influential in 
shaping rioting behaviour in Lyon and Oldham.   
 
The fifth chapter will contrast the experiences in Oldham and Lyon with events in 
Kreuzberg, Berlin; pointing to the validity of an approach based on dialogue with 
ethnic minority youth and local forms of policing.  
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Chapter One - 
Literature Review 
A review of existing literature shows that there have only been a few studies which 
have comparatively analysed the reasons underlying the French and British riots. By 
contrast, scholars have predominantly focused on studies of one country only. These 
studies include single case examinations, as well as the comparison of different cities 
within that one country. These studies have offered six broad reasons for the outbreak 
of riots: Ethnic and religious characteristics of the rioters; the structural context, 
including socio-economic factors; national models of integration and racism; and 
actions of authorities, including the police. Within this, a focus on the different 
dynamics underlying the riots has been largely lost.   
 
This review will firstly address the comparative literature relating to Britain and 
France and will then address the literature that focuses on only one country. Whereas 
the latter address all causes outlined above, the comparative literature considers fewer 
variables. 
 
The Comparative Literature  
 
Wacquant (2009) compares French and British ethnic minority youth riots with riots 
in the US in the sixties and seventies, and addresses them through a predominantly 
structural and socio-economic lens. For Wacquant, the French and British riots are 
largely based on the issue of class where they are seen as an uprising against a 
worsening economic situation and increasing social disparities in the two societies, 
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based in the context of neoliberal restructuring (Wacquant 2009: 94-98). Within this 
analysis the ethnic background of the rioters is lost.  
 
Waddington and King (2009) and Waddington, King and Jobard (2007) compare the 
French riots of 2005 with riots that occurred in England and Wales between 1980 and 
2001 in an attempt to determine whether it is possible to make general theoretical 
assumptions about the underlying causes of urban riots. They argue that the 
underlying causes of spontaneous disorder remain the same across time and from one 
culture to another. These are: firstly, highly segregated, run down and often 
stigmatised social locations, where residents were experiencing the effects of 
economic decline and political marginalisation; secondly, a sufficient number of 
young men, whose form of cultural adaptation led to public condemnation and 
attention of the police; thirdly, police intervention followed by periods of heightened 
vilification of the youth; fourthly, deteriorating police-youth relations, resulting from 
repressive policies; and fifthly, an emotive event which functioned as the trigger 
moment and which reinforced the idea of police hostility or indifference. 
 
Literature relating to either France or Britain 
 
Whereas comparative studies on the riots in France and Britain have been rare, there 
has been a plethora of studies addressing the causal nature of either the French or 
British riots. 
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Ethnic and religious characteristics  
 
As has been outlined previously, Sarkozy and other members of the French authorities 
have portrayed the riots as a criminal outburst, linked to gangs and delinquency. In the 
academic literature, this view has found little resonance. However, a number of 
scholars, as well as more sensationalist journalists, have focussed on the cultural, and 
especially the religious background of the youth involved in the riots.  
 
Phillips (2008: 140-141) has pointed out the issue of self-segregation as the 
underlying cause of the British riots, which in her eyes is linked to a distinct Muslim 
culture. By arguing that neither Hindus nor Chinese have engaged in the riots, she 
contends that the reason for rioting must be cultural. The same has been said about the 
2005 French riots. Pipes (2005) has called them “the first instance of a semi-organised 
Muslim insurgency in Europe”, describing them as “rioting […] to calls of Allah 
Akbar”; and the French philosopher Alan Finkielkraut (quoted in Schneider 2008: 
137) argued that the problem with most of these youth is that they are blacks or 
Arabs, with a Muslim identity and engaged in a pogrom against the Republic. This 
approach clearly reflects the works of Lewis and Huntington and the idea of a „clash 
of civilizations‟ (Huntington 1993, 1996; Lewis 1964, 1990, 2004).  
 
This approach seems to makes little sense in explaining the outbreak of the British or 
French riots. Apart from ongoing criticism of the concept of a clash of civilizations, 
studies show that in France, not all rioters could be qualified as being Muslim 
(Schneider 2008: 137). Further, a cultural approach is unable to explain why some 
areas with Muslim residents have experienced riots, but others have not. Whereas 
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France has the biggest Muslim population in Europe, both in terms of numbers and 
percentage of population, the UK has a smaller Muslim population than Germany, and 
a smaller proportionate Muslim population than the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden 
and Switzerland (Pew Research Centre 2011). Despite their sizable Muslim 
populations, none of these countries have experienced riots by ethnic minority youth 
on the scale as those seen in Britain and France. Secondly, a cultural approach does 
not explain why cities such as Marseille in France, or Rochdale in Britain did not 
experienced riots in 2005 and 2001 respectively, despite having similar demographic 
make ups to Lyon and Oldham. 
 
The use of Islam as a causative factor airbrushes over the real causes and tends to 
obfuscate the issues (Patel 2007: 48), and subsequently hinders a more analytical and 
evidenced based line of inquiry. There is a distinct danger of assigning a religious 
motive and identity to a person who might essentially act upon political or other 
considerations. In Roy‟s words (2007: 31): “If the banlieu is primarily a problem 
because of Islam than there is no social problem.” 
 
Model of Integration and racism 
 
In relation to France, a number of scholars have argued that the reasons for riots are 
rooted specifically in the French system of assimilation (Murray 2006, Haddad et al 
2006, Meier et al 2009, Loch 2009). France‟s system of integration is unique and in 
direct opposition to the multicultural model, which can be found in Britain and in 
most other European countries (Schain 2010). Based on the idea of the „indivisible 
Republic‟, France does not recognise ethnicity in the public sphere.  
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Murray (2006) has argued that the 2005 riots were a direct outcome of the failure of 
the French concept of assimilation and laïcité, a word which cannot be translated into 
English but roughly corresponds to the separation of church and state. According to 
him, the idea of the Republic as „indivisible‟ nation is anachronistic and xeno-racist 
and reflects an apparent unwillingness to acknowledge that modern France is 
multicultural and multiracial (Murphy 2006: 35). As such, the French model produces 
feelings of rejection and exclusion among the country‟s ethnic minorities, which have 
manifested themselves in riots (ibid. 36). Similarly, the riots have been portrayed as 
“rioting for the right to difference”, based on the fact that the French concept of laïcité 
does not allow the fulfilment of different values and attitudes to be held by ethnic 
minority groups (Meier et al 2009: 278-280).  
 
Most accounts that use integration as an explanatory factor also refer to British and 
US systems of multiculturalism, which are seen as „better‟ solutions than the French 
model of immigration. However, French scholars such as Kepel (2010) have criticised 
the British system of multiculturalism after both the 2001 riots, as well as the 7/7 
bombings. Ramadan (2005: 32) argues that a focus on the model of immigration is 
misplaced, and that one model cannot be seen as better as or worse than the other. 
Rather, both countries have to confront the fact that racism is still prevalent within 
their societies, regardless of the differing models of integration, best demonstrated in 
diverse areas such as housing, education and the job market. Similarly, Murphy 
(2011), who has undertaken 12 months of ethnographic field research with youth of 
immigrant background in the French city of Limoges, has argued that the problem is 
not the idea of France as an „indivisible‟ nation, but rather that the French ideal has 
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not been applied to ethnic minorities, based on deep seated discrimination and racism 
across a range of areas, such as the housing market and politics. Koff and Duprez 
(2006: 726) have argued exactly the same, seeing the riots not as a challenge to the 
French model, but rather as a denouncing of its lack of implementation in their 
neighbourhoods. The same has been argued in the case of Britain, where scholars 
have argued that the riots in 2001 represented the fight for a more equal role in society 
and as such a reassertion of the rioters‟ British citizenship (Hussain et al 2005). 
 
Structural and socio-economic explanations 
 
In the United States, riots involving African-American communities in the middle of 
the 20
th
 century have led to many large scale quantitative comparative inquiries in 
relation to similarities in the underlying context of the areas where riots took place. 
For example this included the development of theories according to which riots arise 
out of poverty or inequality, or because of increased inter-ethnic competition (Olzak 
1992, Olzak et al 1996). In the case of the British and French riots of 2001 and 2005, 
with a few exceptions, quantitative large-scale analyses have not been as prominent. 
 
Lagrange (2009) undertook a statistical analysis of the underlying social and 
structural conditions of the different towns involved in the 2005 French riots to try to 
establish connections between the characteristics of a particular location and the 
people who inhabit them and their propensity to riot. He argues that the outbreak of 
riots is highly connected to medium levels of segregation, which correlates with about 
70% of the areas where rioting took place. However, this approach gives relatively 
little insight into why the riots in France have erupted in 2005, and why they have 
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erupted in some places, but not in others – as his correlation of 70% shows, 
segregation itself is not the whole picture. Epstein (2009) also looks at underlying 
structural factors, arguing that attention has to be paid to the role urban renewal 
policies played in the areas affected by riots, as they are likely to have a negative 
impact on the residents of these areas.  
 
The role of socio-economic conditions has played an important role in the literature 
on both Britain, as well as France. Hargreaves (2007: 1-2; 136-137) argues that the 
origins of the French riots lie in deep-seated socio-economic inequalities. 
Additionally, these are exacerbated by entrenched patterns of discrimination against 
immigrant minorities, especially of Arab and African origin, in areas such as the job 
market. Similarly, Rai (2006) has pointed to low wages and income inequality facing 
the Pakistani and British communities in Britain as primary cause of the riots. 
Kundnani (2001) has taken a broader approach and highlighted the nature and 
economic history of the English towns in which rioting took place in 2001. Most of 
the towns were centres of the old textile industry, which have undergone significant 
economic decline since the textile industry moved abroad; leading to greater 
inequalities for its Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations.  
 
However, Ray and Smith (2004) and Mitchell (2011) have argued that whilst poverty 
and unemployment were evident within the areas where rioting took place in Britain 
and France, there were also cities which possessed commensurate socio-economic (as 
well as demographic) characteristics, but which were not affected by riots. An 
example for this is the city of Rochdale (Ray and Smith 1999), or Marseille (Mitchell 
2011). As such, in line with Mill‟s work on comparative analysis, poor socio-
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economic conditions can be qualified as a necessary, not however as a sufficient 
condition for the outbreak of riots by ethnic minority youth in Britain and France. A 
necessary condition is defined as a “circumstance in whose absence the event in 
question cannot occur” (Clark 2009: 18-19); however the condition can occur without 
the effect occurring – it is necessary, but not enough to lead to the event in question or 
in this case, riots.   
 
The role of the police 
 
A large body of literature has addressed the role of authorities, and specifically the 
role of the police, in the outbreaks of the riots in both France and Britain. This 
involves both case studies of particular cities, as well as the discussion of the 
relationship between ethnic minorities and the police on a more general level.  
 
Mouhanna (2009), Schneider (2008) and Begag (2007) have all assigned a central role 
to the police in the outbreaks of the 2005 riots. Whereas Schneider focuses on the city 
of Paris, and Mouhanna and Begag assess the relationship between the police and 
ethnic minority youth on a general level, they all highlight that police brutality, racial 
profiling and continuous identity checks have played a key role in the outbreak of the 
riots – they have in essence created a feeling of second-class citizenship and a sense 
of „us versus them‟ (Begag 2007: 7-25; Mouhanna 2009; Schneider 2008).  
 
The role of the police has equally been highlighted in studies on the riots in Britain. 
Waddington (2007: 102-107) has assessed the role of the police in the Burnley riots 
and have argued that the police had misinterpreted the concerns of the local Asian 
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community. Ray and Smith (2004) and Waddington (2007: 97-101) have argued that 
the police failed to react to racist attacks against Asians, while heavily focussing on 
crimes committed by Asian youth on whites. Failure to adequately protect Asian 
communities led to Asian teenagers assuming the role of protectors, which led to 
rioting .Whereas Kalra and Rhodes (2009) see the main reasons for the riots in 
Oldham in local racial tensions, they agree that the police added further tension to the 
situation.  
 
Approach and contribution by this thesis  
Within the literature discussed above, relatively little attention has been paid to the 
different nature of the British and French riots. The 2005 French riots were 
characterised by clashes between authorities and young people of mainly North 
African and African origin, whereas the 2001 British riots started with a clash 
between Asian youth and a right-wing group, then turning into clashes with the 
police. This difference has received little attention in academic analysis. Instead, it is 
often seen as a by-product of the countries‟ differences in integration policies. Body-
Gendrot (2010: 190) argues that in the case of Britain, a focus on ethnicity and 
identity politics (through multiculturalism) exacerbates the potentiality of conflict. In 
her eyes, French rioters express their anger against the symbols of the state and as 
such protest for more respect, equity and against discrimination, whereas in the UK 
they represent an emphasis on identity differences. Similarly, Kepel (2010) argues 
that the French system of integration has had the effect that the French riots had 
nothing to do with ethnicity, as compared to Britain.  
 
These accounts however overlook that in Britain, riots have also taken place which 
were directed against the state and authorities without an obvious involvement of 
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right-wing groups or the white community. Examples for this include the riots in the 
1980s in places such as Tottenham or Brixton, or the recent riots in Tottenham in 
August 2011. As such, an analysis of rioting behaviour in the two countries would 
benefit from a closer look at the interaction of the groups involved on a city level in 
comparative perspective. This thesis seeks to add to broader studies by undertaking a 
comparative study of the riots in Oldham (2001) and Lyon (2005). To gain insight 
into the question of why rioting behaviour in these cities has differed, it is essential to 
establish what has led to their outbreak in the first place. As such, this study is guided 
by two questions: why have riots erupted in these two places and why is it that in 
Lyon, clashes have taken place solely between the youth and the police, whereas in 
Oldham clashes have also taken place with the white community?  
 
It will be argued that the role of the police and its relationship with the state is central 
to answering both questions. By focusing on the role of the police, this thesis builds 
upon the works of scholars such as Schneider (2008) and Waddington and King 
(2007). Whereas poor socio-economic settings present the necessary conditions for 
the riots in Lyon and Oldham, it will be argued that the role of the police is crucial in 
understanding their outbreak and to explain differences in rioting behaviour. As such, 
the role of the police presents the sufficient condition. In turn, it will be argued that 
the relationship between the police and the state in France and Britain has played an 
important role in affecting rioting behaviour in Oldham and Lyon.  
 
Britain and France have a number of similarities, which have made them popular for 
comparison in the past, this includes: a similar population size; being first 
democracies in Europe; both have been colonial powers which led to large immigrant 
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communities – with France‟s immigrant population bring primarily of North African 
origin and Britain‟s of Asian and Afro-Caribbean; the development of quasi ghettos 
characterized by high unemployment and low wages, home to these immigrant 
communities (Rai 2006; Hargreaves 2007); as well as conflict between immigrant 
communities and the police. However they also differ in one important aspect, their 
centralised versus decentralised nature and the different relationship this creates 
between police and state. This factor is of primary importance in affecting differences 
in riot behaviour, also it is not claimed that it is the only one.  
 
Methodology  
This study takes the form of a comparative analysis into the question of why riots 
erupted in Lyon and Oldham and why the riots have shown different characteristics - 
with a focus on the role of the police and its relationship with the state. In order to do 
this, it is important to get a thorough understanding of the dynamics at play in the two 
cities leading up to the riots, requiring reference to a number of different sources. 
Firstly, this has involved a range of primary sources, such as government, police and 
NGO reports, newspaper articles and blogs. This also includes some quantitative data 
in the form of statistics on issues such as stop and search, deaths in custody and racist 
incidents, predominantly in the case of Oldham. Secondly, secondary sources have 
been consulted to make use of former studies conducted into these two localities, as 
well as to get a broader understanding of the role of the police in the two countries.  
 
Whereas research into Oldham has profited from a large amount of data, the case of 
Lyon has proven significantly more difficult. Firstly, more in-depth research, for 
example into government records, was impeded by a language barrier. Whereas 
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limited French skills allowed making use of some newspaper articles obtained 
through Factiva and statistical data, they were not sufficient enough to analyse more 
comprehensive data and literature. This was also the case for French academic 
literature on Lyon, from which the thesis would have profited. Secondly, most of the 
existing research in English focuses on events and interactions in and around Paris, 
whereas Lyon has largely been neglected. Thirdly, the centralised nature of the French 
state and in particular the organisation of the French police force has constituted 
another obstacle. Whereas there is a wealth of information on the French police in 
general, due to its centralised nature, there is very little information focused on Lyon 
specifically. Rather, it is national policies, which determine actions in Lyon. As such, 
an examination of Lyon has required a wider examination of French policies, blurring 
the boundaries. However, whilst this has been a problem, it seems to be a problem 
faced by all academics conducting research into the issue. Research seems to be either 
conducted on the French police force per se, rather than into a specific city (for 
example see Mouhanna 2009), or when the focus is on a particular location, 
references are still often made to the French police in general and national policies 
(for example see Schneider 2008).  
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Chapter Two - 
Theories of Riots 
This section will provide an overview of the different theoretical approaches to 
understanding riots, in order to establish the approach upon which this thesis will be 
based. Riots belong to the broader category of contentious collective action, which 
encompasses a diverse range of actions, such as protests, strikes, revolutions and 
social movements (Tarrow 2011: 7). Whilst a great deal of collective action occurs 
routinely within everyday life, collective action  becomes contentious when it inhibits 
either new or unaccepted claims, involving the confrontation of ordinary people with 
authorities, elites or opponents (Tarrow 2011: 7-8). 
 
There has been much debate, however, over the existence of underlying claims in 
relation to riots. Whereas social movements engage in a range of diverse activities 
which are planned and organised, such as strikes and protests, (Tarrow 2011: 8) that 
clearly articulate a set of goals or objectives,  the underlying motivations for riots are 
less clear. Instead, riots are characterized by their violent, illegitimate and 
spontaneous nature (Marx 1970: 24). Lacking leadership or spokespeople these 
movements usually fail to articulate a set of goals. In addition, riots “are bound by the 
socio-economic and spatial immobility of their participants in contrast to social 
movements, which have the ability to shift their mobilization to a broader spatial and 
political scale” (Simiti 2009: 2). 1 Given the ambiguity surrounding the causes of riots, 
                                                 
1
 However, it should be kept in mind that although rioting behaviour and social movements differ from 
one another (Giugni 1998: 377), the two concepts should not be regarded as mutually exclusive (Simiti 
2009: 2). Firstly, riots may at times lead to the development of social movements as has been the case 
in the 1984 riots in Lawrence, Massachusetts; and secondly, riots may form part of a social 
movement‟s larger cycle of protest, which can be exemplified by the Watts riots in 1965 which 
occurred within the context of the civil rights movement (ibid. 2-3).  
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three main explanations or models have been developed:
 
irrational; rational; and 
issueless riots, with issueless riots being a modernized form of irrational riots.  
Irrational Riots 
Early theorizing on riots, and collective violence more generally, has sketched an 
inherently negative image of rioters and their behaviour, as can be exemplified by the 
works of Le Bon (1908) and Martin (1923). Riots were portrayed as the emotional 
outcome of “herd instincts” (Marx 1970: 21), in which the individual loses control 
over their own actions. In the words of Le Bon (1908: 36): 
 
“He [the individual forming part of a crowd] is no longer himself, 
but has become an automaton who has ceased to be guided by his 
will. […] Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he 
is a barbarian – that is, a creature acting by instinct.”  
 
Importantly, this means riots are seen as something unusual, unable to be analysed to 
the same degree as “normal” political life (Tilly 1978: 9; Smelser 1970). As such, 
underlying motivations for riots are seen as having no rational basis. Rather, it is 
argued that rioters find some sort of justification for their actions by creating a 
fictitious and temporary environment (Martin 1923: 194). It follows that riots are seen 
as the actions of “social misfits, criminals and riff raff” (Marx 1970: 21), and as 
inherently disruptive to an otherwise functioning society. The last part of this section 
will show that far from being outdated, this view continues to exist, and is especially 
espoused by authorities, and members of the public who view rioting groups with 
suspicion.     
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Rational Riots 
 
Since the middle of the 20
th
 century, scholars have started to fundamentally challenge 
the irrational concept of riots. Most importantly, new research into riots has stressed 
the idea of an underlying “generalized belief” of collective violence (Smelser 1962, 
1970: 48). A generalized belief means that the rioters connect grievances with a 
particular institution, individual or symbol against which the violence is directed 
(Marx 1970: 24). Consequently, riots are no longer seen as irrational but instead can 
be analysed like “normal” political behaviour (Smelser 1970: 47-48). As such, riots 
can function as an expression of grievances and injustice, rather than simply as 
disrupting an otherwise well-functioning society.  
 
The transition to viewing riots as having rational causes has two key ramifications.  
Firstly, members of a crowd engaged in rioting are no longer seen as disconnected 
individuals, who have nothing else in common except that they have lost control. As 
has been argued by Reicher et al (2004: 560), individuals are no longer seen as losing 
their identity in a crowd, but rather as embracing a social identity; entailing the 
question “what makes my group distinctive compared to other groups?” It follows that 
the level of analysis extends beyond the characteristics of the individual rioter to the 
interactions between different groups in society. In this context, Reicher and his 
colleagues have further highlighted the idea of “collective memories”, pointing to 
inter-group histories as an important indication for contemporary tensions (ibid. 561; 
Waddington et al 2005: 497): 
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[…] groups have collective memories which can sometimes go back well 
beyond the experience or even the lifetime of any individual member. 
Crowds will “remember” their supposed mistreatment at the hands of 
another group many years ago and they will retain a suspicion and a 
hostility to all members of the other group, irrespective of whether they 
individually have done anything to offend. 
 
Secondly, viewing riots as a response to a grievance shifts the focus of inquiry to the 
holders of power and how their actions may have created that grievance. As has been 
highlighted by Smelser (1970: 51), through unresponsiveness to grievances and 
repression, the holders of political power can be contributors to the origins of the 
outburst of violence. As such, the perception of riots as irrational might allow holders 
of power to ignore legitimate grievances and instead perpetuate the status quo. 
Waddington and King (2005: 499) have highlighted a similar point, arguing for the 
need to address the legitimacy accorded to certain group demands by key ideological 
institutions – as it is likely that acts such as public denunciations risks alienating an 
aggrieved a group even further. 
 
Issueless riots 
 
In 1978, Tilly argued that students of conflict have moved from the question of 
whether collective violence is a normal and rational phenomenon to how rational it is 
and what sort of rationality it involves (Tilly 1978: 53). However, when it comes 
specifically to riots the issue is not as clear, as Marx‟s (1970) concept of issueless 
riots shows. According to Marx (1970: 23), the idea of seeing riots as rational has 
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gone too far in the sense that scholars have stopped paying attention to a range of riots 
which are not primarily motivated by a critique of the current social order. He blames 
this on an inherent left-wing bias on part of many academics, which automatically 
connects protests involving students, ethnic minorities and populations in developing 
countries to the expression of injustice and political motivations. Whereas Marx does 
not deny that riots can be used as a tool to express grievances, he adds issueless riots 
as a third category – where outward actions are the same as with rational riots, but 
where elements of protest, ideology, grievance, lack of access to channels for 
redressing complaints and social change are at best insignificant factors or at worst, 
absent altogether (ibid. 23-24).  
 
Marx highlights an important point; there is much variation between riots and this has 
to be taken into account when analysing the nature of their outbreak. This has been 
highlighted by the media‟s analysis of the 2011 riots in England, where commentators 
rarely made a distinction between the first wave of riots in Tottenham which have 
involved clashes with the police and the riots which later spread around the country 
and which often only involved looting. However, the label “issueless” riot has to be 
treated with caution, and attention has to be paid as to who applies that that label to 
riots.  
 
The reactions by Sarkozy and the French police union after the riots in 2005 illustrate 
this point. During the course of the riots, Sarkozy explicitly used the words “scum” 
and “thugs” to describe the rioters, attributing the violence to criminal gangs of 
delinquents (Moran 2008: 2). Similarly, representatives of the police union called the 
rioters “the scum [of the suburbs] at war with the state” and called for “the eradication 
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of those who rot the life of the inhabitants of the suburbs and direct the youth there 
against the forces of order” (quoted in Moran 2008: 2). However, as has later been 
revealed, the intelligence service of the French police never believed this claim. 
Already during the course of the riots an internal report, which was later leaked to the 
press, stated that the violence was not organised or manipulated by any groups or 
gangs, either militant or Islamist (ibid. 3). In addition, most of the youth tried before 
the courts in Paris after the riots were unknown to the justice system and did not have 
the criminal pasts that belied the government‟s claims. However, by portraying the 
riots as the outcome of “scum” and gangs (echoing the terminology employed by Le 
Bon), Sarkozy not only asserted the need for repressive police action (ibid.), but also 
diverted attention away from any underlying problems, in effect perpetuating the 
status quo. As such, the “issueless” label should only be applied with caution and after 
thorough empirical analysis.  
 
The approach taken by this thesis 
 
By analysing the role of the police in the outbreak of the riots in Oldham and Lyon, 
this thesis is situated within the category of rational riots. It takes into account the role 
of authorities in the outbreak of the riots, and extends the critical analysis beyond 
individual characteristics of the rioters. It also traces the relationship between 
different groups over a longer period of time, to show how feelings of injustice have 
accumulated. As such, it falls within what Tilly (1978: 42) has called modern forms of 
collective violence, in which participants commonly express their grievance that they 
are unjustly denied their rights in one form or another. Whilst this thesis 
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acknowledges that issueless riots exist, it argues that this label cannot be applied to 
the riots in either Oldham or Lyon.  
 
„Rational riots‟ can further be divided into two categories: firstly, instrumental riots, 
where their outbreak has been important in solving a group‟s problems; and secondly 
riots where a generalized belief is present, but where riots do not advance the interests 
of the group (Marx 1970: 26-29). According to Marx, instrumental riots are likely to 
involve a dissident group against authorities, whereas the latter often involves 
violence between groups divided on a range of grounds such as religious or ethnic 
lines, in which authorities only function as a bystander (ibid.). However, when it 
comes to riots by ethnic minority youth, the distinction is not as clear. As has been 
seen in France over the last few decades, riots between youth and authorities have 
erupted periodically and achieved little in the way of positive change. Indeed, the 
actions or reforms taken after a riot depend on how the government and the wider 
community define the original causes of the riots – it can either be framed in terms of 
discrimination on part of the majority, or as an unwillingness to integrate on part of 
the minority. The factor of „youth‟ is additionally problematic, as it is quickly 
associated with a loss of respect for authorities, parents, and law and order.   
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Chapter Three – 
The riots in Oldham: Asian gang violence and the innocent white 
victim? 
 
This chapter will assess the dynamics leading to the outbreak of the riots in Oldham in 
2001. What will be shown is that the police in Oldham failed to assure the Asian 
community that attacks on them were taken seriously. This chapter will argue that 
although the police did not violently harass the Asian community, it engaged into 
non-violent forms of harassment, and that this created a space in which local right-
wing elements increased their attacks on the Asian community. The chapter will start 
with an overview of the events leading up to the riot‟s outbreak, focusing on the 
“trigger” moment. It will then establish the above claim in three steps: firstly, it will 
examine how the police dealt with racial violence in Oldham; secondly, this chapter 
will assess the attacks by white racist groups on the Asian community and reasons the 
community perceived that it was not afforded protection; lastly, this chapter will 
address the role of stop searches and police brutality against minorities.  
 
An overview of the events of the 26
th
 of May 2001
2
  
On the evening of the 26
th
 of May, an argument broke out between a number of white 
and Asian boys outside a chip shop on Roundthorn Road in Glodwick. According to 
witnesses, trouble erupted after a 16 year-old white youth threw a brick at one of the 
Asian boys playing cricket in the street, calling him a „Paki bastard‟ (Searchlight 
Magazine 2003). After a brief fight, the young Asian boy ran home to inform his 
                                                 
2
 The following account is largely based on the accounts of Waddington (2007: 97-98), as well as 
Searchlight (2003) 
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older brother of what had occurred. The two then decided to approach a house which 
two of the white boys were seen entering. According to Rashid and his brother 
Tanveer Ahmed, the front door of the house was slightly ajar, leading one of the boys 
to push it open further to see inside. Almost immediately, Sharon Hoy, the mother of 
one of the young white boys, who was inside the house with a number of friends, 
became racially abusive, calling Rashid and his brother „f***ing black bastards‟ and 
„Pakis‟ (Searchlight 2003). According to residents, the boys ran away, with Sharon 
Hoy chasing after them, shouting. 
 
The situation then escalated when Sharon Hoy called her brother Darren, who was 
drinking in a local Oldham pub, with the message “a Paki has kicked the door in”. 
The background of Darren and the friends he was drinking with seems to be crucial in 
how the events unfolded as the group consisted of British National Party (BNP) 
supporters, and members of a number of affiliated groups (Searchlight 2003). Earlier 
in the day, they had already been caught on CCTV, singing racist songs and harassing 
taxi drivers on the street, which involved a confrontation with the police in which one 
of the men was arrested (ibid.). After a brief deliberation, the group of about ten men 
set off in three taxis to the area of Glodwick.  
 
What followed was a violent rampage in the area. Armed with sticks, Darren and his 
friends threatened Asians walking on the street and sitting in cars and smashed the 
windows of Asian-owned shops and homes. Victims included mothers with their 
children, as well as a pregnant lady who suffered from shock after her windows were 
kicked in. Subsequently, the police were called, eventually arriving on scene thirty 
minutes after the violence had erupted. Although police arrested most of the men 
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involved, the rumour had already spread that Asians were under attack by white 
racists who were proceeding unchallenged by police. Asian youth continued to pour 
into the area, increasingly upset with the fact that these attacks were allowed to have 
happened. This anger was exacerbated as a few of their number were arrested.  
 
An hour later, about 500 Asian youths were involved in battles with the police in the 
centre of Glodwick, erecting street barricades and throwing bricks and stones at the 
police line, with over 700 petrol bombs being thrown in the space of just seven hours 
(Searchlight: 2003). Violence took place for three consecutive nights, with rioters 
setting fire to cars, a number of businesses and pubs and on occasions also clashing 
with a number of white youth gangs.  
 
Framing racial violence in Oldham  
In order to understand why the ethnic minority responded as they did, it is important 
to understand policing objectives in Oldham. Since the middle of 1998, the Chief 
Superintendent of Oldham, Eric Hewitt, had continually voiced concerns about „Asian 
on white‟ gang violence in Oldham, based on the publication of statistics on race hate 
crimes which started at that time. For the years 1998-1999, 53% of victims were 
white, compared to 35% with an Asian ethnic background (Ray et al 2004: 686). In 
1998, he argued: 
 
“There is evidence that [Asian male youth] are trying to create exclusive areas for 
themselves. Anyone seems to be a target if they are white. It is a growing polarisation 
between some sections of the Asian youth and white youth on the grounds of race, 
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manifesting itself in violence, predominantly Asian.” (quoted in Waddington 2007: 
99).   
 
Hewitt made similar remarks just a few months before the riots broke out, voicing 
concern about the increase of racist attacks by Pakistani and Bangladeshi youth gangs, 
again based on the publication of statistics (Kalra et al 2009: 52). This newest data 
showed that in the past 12 months, out of 572 racist incidents, 60% were committed 
by Asians on white men (ibid.). As has been pointed out by Ray et al (1999: 2; 2003), 
Hewitt portrayed the major problem of racial violence in Oldham as stemming from 
attacks by Asian youth on innocent whites. 
 
However the way in which the police have interpreted these statistics - and 
subsequently the issue of racially motivated attacks in Oldham – is fundamentally 
problematic, as they have taken as objective measurements for reality (Waddington 
2007; Kalra et al 2009; Ray et al 2004; Ray et al 1999). It can be argued that such 
statistics are highly skewed, as academics question the willingness of members of an 
ethnic minority to report racially motivated attacks to the police. According to Smith 
(2009), the decision to file a complaint to the police or an individual officer depends 
not only on the seriousness of the grievance and the individual‟s self-confidence, but 
also their confidence in the system‟s ability to follow-up and take action on the 
complaint, as well as the availability of support and assistance. In reality, people with 
a minority ethnic background are often less likely to file a complaint, which means 
attacks on Asians would be seriously underrepresented in official statistics. A remark 
from 21-year old student Suhal Hussain from Oldham just four weeks before the riots 
highlights both points:  
 30 
 
“I have seen Asians being attacked and they didn’t always think it was worth 
reporting. Whatever the police say today, the fact is that they did not always 
respond to complaints from Asians in the same way that they did to complaints 
from white people.”  
(quoted in Daily Telegraph 25
th
 April 2001) 
 
In addition, Oldham was unique in the sense that it took a very proactive stance 
towards the reporting of racially motivated crimes at that time. Jennifer Garner, 
community and race relations officer at Oldham police station, states that Oldham 
division was one of the first divisions that actively encouraged the reporting of 
racially motivated crimes (quoted in O‟Neill 2002). However given the hesitance of 
minority ethnic groups to report such incidents, a proactive stance is likely to inflate 
official statistics even further; on the one hand it is questionable that this approach 
will overcome the problem of underreporting, and on the other it actively encourages 
whites to see attacks committed by people with an ethnic background as racially 
motivated. The loose definition of a racially motivated incident in Britain as „any 
incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person‟, underlines 
this problem. As such, it is no surprise that the statistics collected in Oldham inhibit 
some unique features in comparison to other divisions in the area covered by the 
Greater Manchester Police Force (Ray et al 2004; Ray et al 1999). Firstly, Oldham 
showed by far the highest numbers of racist violence compared to other areas, even 
those areas which are demographically similar and secondly, Oldham was unique in 
the sense that the majority of victims of racist attacks were whites (ibid.). This 
seriously questions the extent to which these numbers provide an „objective‟ picture 
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of racial incidents - and by extension, the effectiveness and validity of the police‟s 
decision to focus on Asian gang violence. 
 
This focus on Asian gang violence had the effect that all racist incidents involving 
Asians as perpetrators appear to be violent in nature, which is in line with Alexander‟s 
(2004: 532) picture of constructing Asian youth gangs as “the new Asian folk devil”. 
In reality, only about 150 racist incidents in 2000/01 involved violence, out of which 
about half had been committed by Asians and the other half by whites (Chris Hilyer, 
Deputy Leader of Oldham Council quoted in Financial Times 27
th
 April 2001). As 
such, a focus on Asian gang violence as Oldham‟s main and unique problem is 
doubtful, and served to downplay the attacks on the Asian community.  
 
The police‟s actions against racially motivated crime at that time equally highlighted a 
focus on crime committed by Asians against whites, even within seemingly „neutral‟ 
measures. In 1999, a Racial Crime Squad was set up in Oldham, only the second one 
in the wider GMP region, where a team of four sergeants would investigate racial 
incidents and build common profiles of suspects (Manchester Evening News, 27
th
 
October 1999). Whilst the police stressed that all forms of racial crimes would be 
targeted (ibid.), both Hewitt and Wilmot independently portrayed the setting up of this 
unit as direct measure against Asian attacks on whites. Hewitt openly admitted that 
the move had been partly prompted by an attack of four Asian youth on a pensioner 
(ibid.), whereas a year later Wilmot portrayed it as a response to a unique problem in 
Oldham, namely that Asian attacks on whites had recently outnumbered those by 
whites on Asians (Manchester Evening News 22
nd
 August 2000). Similarly, an 
apparent increase in Asian gang violence nearly led to the instalment of CCTV 
 32 
cameras in predominantly Asian areas (Kalra et al 2009: 48). No such measurement 
was proposed for any other areas, including those which Asians labelled as dangerous 
because of the activity of white racist groups within them. 
 
Just four weeks before the riots, an incident took place which brought the issue of 
racist Asian gang violence further in the spotlight. On his way home from a rugby 
game on the 21
st
 of April, 76 year-old pensioner Walter Chamberlain was attacked by 
a gang of Asian teenagers while walking through an industrial estate, being pushed to 
the ground and being beaten, resulting in a fractured cheekbone (Waddington 2009: 
100). Headlines such as “Beaten to a pulp … for being white: Racism in Britain” (The 
Sun, 24
th
 April 2001) were run in newspapers across the country, pointing to the 
apparent racist character of the attack and the problem of „Asian on white‟ racism in 
Oldham. This attack seemed to vindicate a remark made by a few Asian youths to a 
reporter from the BBC two weeks earlier, claiming they were establishing „no go‟ 
zones for whites in certain areas in Oldham (Waddington 2009: 100).  
 
The police in Oldham also stressed that the attack was racially motivated. A Deputy 
Chief Inspector confirmed to the Manchester Evening News that the pensioner was 
racially abused before he was attacked, saying that he was told to get out of the area 
because he was white and therefore “not allowed in this part of the town”, with one 
Asian youth saying, “This is our area – get out” (Manchester Evening News, 23rd 
April 2001). This was confirmed by a police force spokesman (The Guardian, 28
th
 
April 2001). However Mr Chamberlain did not mention this in his initial statement, 
and his family denied that there was a racial motive to the attack (ibid.).  
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This situation had put increased pressure on the Asian community at large, and 
especially on young people. Tariq Rafique, chair of the Pakistani Youth Association 
in 2001, voiced frustration that all Asians had been branded racist since the attack on 
Walter Chamberlain, rather than making a distinction between a small number of 
violent youth and the community as a whole (ibid.). In addition, whereas the police 
offered a reward of £10 000 for information leading to the arrest of the perpetrators, 
nothing similar was done about two attacks involving Asian victims on the same day 
– one involving the stabbing of a taxi driver, and the other an attack on a teenage boy 
by a group of 15 white right-wing youth (CARF 2001). 
 
Organised right-wing attacks on the Asian community  
At the same time as the focus on „Asian gang violence‟ increased, the BNP ran a 
successful election campaign in Oldham, with the slogan “Equal Rights for Oldham 
Whites” (Grumke et al 2006: 118), capitalising on the racial incident statistics 
released by the police (ibid. 117). The BNP was relatively successful in leading the 
white population to believe that it was the victim of an Asian race „mafia‟ (ibid. 118); 
constantly handing out flyers and organising marches including a protest in front of 
the police station to react against „Asian gang violence‟. The Asian community on the 
other hand blamed the police for not preventing what they saw as racist intimidation 
(Manchester Evening News, 2
nd
 June 2001). Significant support for the BNP amongst 
the population can be seen in the parliamentary election results of 2001 (just a few 
weeks after the riots), where the BNP gained 16.4% of the vote in Oldham West and 
Royton and 11.2% in Oldham East and Saddleworth.
3
 Interviews conducted for the 
                                                 
3
 Available from the Oldham Council Website: http://www.oldham.gov.uk/council/elections/election-
results/election-2001.htm  
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Oldham Independent Review
4
 (2001: 79-80) with white residents after the riots show 
that they are in general supportive of the police, however especially young whites 
stressed that increased police presence should be added on the street, and numerous 
comments were made regarding a lack of public safety. As such, sections of the white 
community equally questioned whether the police was doing “their job”. Right-wing 
groups in Oldham seem increasingly to have taken matters into their own hands. In 
the four weeks prior to the riots, no less than three incidents occurred where the Asian 
community came under attack by racist groups, each of which led to a stand off with 
Asian youth. All three incidents exacerbated the feeling that the police solely cared 
about attacks on whites. 
 
The first incident occurred during a Stoke City versus Oldham Athletic soccer game 
in the city, on the 28
th
 April (CARF 2001; Waddington 2007: 101). Already before 
the game, white racists gathered in pubs in the city and were chanting racist songs and 
intimidating non-white pedestrians. Although the police did escort these groups to the 
stadium, racist abuse took place while walking through a predominantly Bangladeshi 
business and residential street in Westwood. One Bangladeshi business was attacked 
despite the presence of a number of police vans. It was reported that the police‟s 
failure to intervene in the matter led to a tense standoff between police and local 
Asian youth, with the hooligans being escorted away (CARF 2001).  
 
Despite requests by the community to take a different route after the game, police led 
the soccer fans back through the same area, where this time Asian youth had already 
gathered to meet them, throwing stones and possibly a petrol bomb (CARF 2001; 
                                                 
4
 The Oldham Independent Review was an official inquiry by the council into the reasons behind the 
riots. According to the review, the main reason for the riot was segregation and mistrust between the 
white and the Asian community.  
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Waddington 2007). With riot police being deployed to separate racist soccer fans 
from local Asian youth, tensions erupted between the police and the locals after the 
football crowd had departed. CARF (2001) reports that the police deployed dogs, 
truncheons and a riot van to disperse the crowd, with about seven people being 
injured by the police. As has been pointed out by Waddington, there was a feeling that 
the police turned on the Asian community rather than protecting them and providing 
„de facto‟ protection for the hooligans (Waddington 2007: 101).  
 
The second incident occurred on the 5
th
 May, in which a group of NF and some BNP 
right-wing supporters gathered in the town despite a ban on all political marches by 
the Home Office (Searchlight 2001). Both police and media have called the day a 
success because the police seemingly prevented large scale clashes between the right-
wing supporters and Anti-Nazi League activists who organised a counter 
demonstration. However, a number of events took place that cast doubt as to the 
successful nature of policing on the day (ibid.). Firstly, although the police had caught 
up with the right-wing group outside Oldham, they did not prevent them from 
entering the town. Secondly, a number of racists slipped through the police lines and 
gathered in a pub outside a predominantly Asian estate, where they initiated clashes 
with local youths. Thirdly, the police demobilised at the end of the day although many 
of the hooligans were still present, resulting in several dozen NF and BNP supporters 
entering predominantly Asian areas seeking trouble. As such, the policing on the day 
was less likely to be deemed a success by the Asian community who were left feeling 
vulnerable and neglected.  
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The third incident, spanning over four days, occurred in the week leading up to the 
riot. On Monday the 20
th
 May, a number of former students who were NF and BNP 
supporters went back to their old school and threw stones at Asian students while 
shouting racial abuse (CARF 2001). This continued until Wednesday, with police 
failing to step in. On Thursday, students of the school mobilised to confront the right-
wing group, which led to a large stand-off. On this day the police arrived to separate 
the two opposed fractions, arresting 14 youths in total, including ten former right-
wing students. The fact that there were also four Asian students arrested for public 
disorder was met with anger, as they were seen to have mobilised on the grounds of 
defending themselves against right-wing incursions (ibid.).  
 
 
Racial Stereotyping and excessive use of force in Oldham’s police force  
It might be too simplistic to argue that Oldham‟s police force was solely representing 
the white community. For example, a spokeswoman for the force highlighted that the 
police was not dealing with anti-white attacks only and similarly, the police requested 
a ban on all political marches from the Home Office to counter right-wing groups 
earlier in the year (The Independent, 25
th
 April 2001). However non-violent 
harassment in form of an overall strong focus on „Asian gang violence‟ by Oldham‟s 
Superintendent, combined with the fact that the police failed to prevent right-wing 
attacks on a number of occasions, meant that the police failed to assure the Asian 
community that their concerns were taken seriously.  
 
In addition, as has become clear through interviews for the Oldham Independent 
Review (2001: 78), Asians felt that they were singled out for stop searches by the 
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police, further highlighting that they perceived the police to be aligned with the white 
community. Similarly, according to interviews conducted with Asian market traders 
after the riots, there was a feeling of increased surveillance by the police since the 
beginning of 2001, the time the newest statistics on race hate crime were released by 
the Oldham police (Ray et al 2004). Whereas there is no „hard data‟ on the issue of 
surveillance, mandatory ethnic monitoring in relation to stop searches was introduced 
for all British police forces in 1996 (GMP 2002: 4), which gives an insight into the 
question as to whether the police was specifically targeting the Asian community. 
 
A number of insights can be discerned. Firstly, according to data available from April 
2000 to March 2001, Asians do not seem to be particularly targeted in Oldham in 
ordinary stop searches. In the period covered, they made up a total of 12.5% of all 
people searched (GMP 2002: 10), which corresponds roughly to an Asian population 
of 11.88% in Oldham (Office for National Statistics 2001: 66). In relation to other 
divisions in the wider Greater Manchester Police force area, Oldham has a slightly 
higher quota of stop searching Asians when compared to census data than any other 
division except Bury. However, the difference is small, and especially in light of 
methodological problems with this comparison it cannot be discerned that Asians are 
particularly targeted in Oldham. 
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Table 2.1 Stop Searches recorded by GMP division in 2000/01 for percentage of 
Asians stopped out of all stops, compared with percentage of Asian population 
 
Division Asians stopped  Percentage of Population 
Manchester 6.4% 9.13% 
Salford 1.01% 1.39% 
Tameside 2.13% 3.98% 
Stockport 1.55% 2.1% 
Bolton 5.03% 9.06% 
Wigan 0.23% 0.44% 
Trafford 3.47% 4.06% 
Bury 6.93% 4.04% 
Rochdale  5.8% 9.8% 
Oldham 12.5% 11.88 
Total 4.5% 5.65% 
Source: GMP (2002: 10) and Office for National Statistics (2001: 66).  
 
Police brutality and excessive use of force 
As will be shown in relation to Lyon, police brutality has played an important role in 
the outbreaks of the riots in 2005; as such the question poses itself if this was also an 
influential factor in the outbreak of the riots in Oldham. According to official data on 
deaths in custody or in contact with the police, no people of Asian ethnic origin have 
died in custody or in contact with police in Oldham in the years between 1996 and 
2001, the time from which ethnic background was monitored (Home Office 1997-
2002). This is also true for the GMP as a whole. This does not mean that the 
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relationship between ethnic minorities and the British police has been an untroubled 
one over the years. According to the Institute of Race Relations (IRR: 2004), the years 
between 1978 and 2001 have seen over 150 incidents in which the death of an ethnic 
minority individual has given rise to concern, based on either suspicious or 
mysterious circumstances, including deaths in prison. According to information made 
available on the IRR website, which details location and nature of the incidents, this 
did not include any occurrences in Oldham. 
 
As police brutality and excessive use of force do not necessarily lead to the death of 
the victim, it is vital to look at other sources which give an insight into the potential 
mistreatment of ethnic minority individuals through the hands of the police. Official 
channels to address this question are limited, based on insufficient coverage and doubt 
over whether members from ethnic minority communities are likely to file a 
complaint against the police. In regards to police brutality, while it can be discerned 
that in the three years leading up to the riots a total of 338 people of Asian origin 
complained about police misconduct, about 7% of total complaints (Home Office 
1999, 2000, 2001), there are no more details of how many of these complaints have 
been filed in Oldham and for which reasons those have been filed. 
 
In regards to the excessive use of force, evaluation of the confidence of the public in 
the British police complaints system showed that a significant number of people from 
minority ethnic groups were sceptical about the system and would not be inclined to 
use it (Clements 2008: 110). Not only does a previous negative experience of police 
aversely affect a person‟s willingness to complain, but people with an ethnic 
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background also said they would be more likely to issue a complaint with a human 
rights organisation or a legal advice centre.  
 
For these reasons, an analysis of accounts other than those generated through the 
police is essential in gaining more insight into the question of whether police brutality 
or excessive use of force is a matter of concern in the town of Oldham. By and large, 
the issue does not attract much attention in the British mainstream media, with the 
exception of a high profile case. The Manchester Evening News (10
th
 August 2004) 
reports that in 1997 then prisoner Shahid Farooq from Oldham got slapped and 
racially abused by a prison officer a day before his release – while surrounding 
officers simply stood by and watched. Although Shahid got an external court 
settlement of £17 500, it is unclear whether the officer got disciplined for his actions.  
 
Accounts by the Forum against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR) show that an 
absence of reports in the mainstream media does not necessarily portray the reality in 
Oldham. After the riots, FAIR sent a delegation to Oldham to engage with the local 
community and talk about problems affecting the wider community, where the 
delegation also met with a number of individuals alleging police brutality. 
Photographic and video evidence emerged of various incidents. Based on these 
accounts, FAIR helped to set up a local task team including two lawyers to help 
victims of police brutality in Oldham. Although this issue does not seem to be the 
main problem in the interaction between Asian youth and the police in Oldham, even 
a small number of incidents are more than likely to further weaken an already porous 
relationship.    
 
 41 
Conclusion 
It was not the direct relationship between police and Asian youth in Oldham which 
led to the riots, but rather the perceived relationship with the white community. A 
strong focus on dubious race hate crime statistics and numerous attacks by right-wing 
groups had the effect that the Asian community perceived the police to be indifferent 
about their concerns, and only to react to attacks on whites. Equally, right-wing 
groups perceived that the police were not „doing their job of protecting whites from 
Asian gang violence‟, leading them to increasingly take matters into their own hands. 
As they attacked the Asian community on the day the riots broke out, Asian youth felt 
yet again that the police did not act to protect them.  
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Chapter Four - 
The riots in Lyon: A long story of confrontation between the police and 
ethnic minority youth 
 
The previous chapter has assessed the dynamics behind the riots in Oldham, arguing 
that the police were perceived as being aligned with the white community and 
neglecting the concerns of the Asian minority. This non-violent form of harassment 
gave space for right wing groups to intervene, especially in the light of a focus on 
Asian gang violence in Oldham. In contrast, this chapter will argue that the key to 
understanding the outbreak of the 2005 riots in Lyon is the violent harassment on the 
part of the police. In Lyon, a more aggressive style of policing has satisfied local 
right-wing elements, but right-wing pressure is exercised through the political arena, 
especially on a national level.  
 
Due to France‟s highly centralised police structure under the control of the Interior 
Minister, an analysis of the dynamics in Lyon will have to include a focus on national 
policies. In addition, in light of similar conflicts in the past, an analysis of the 
situation in 2005 greatly profits from a more historical approach. This chapter will 
show that Lyon‟s oppressive policing structure gave rise not only to organised protest, 
as was the case in the 1980s, but also led to escalation of violent confrontation in the 
form of riots. This chapter will start with an overview of the 2005 riots, highlighting 
the events that triggered their outbreak. The second part will approach Lyon from a 
historical perspective, to highlight decades of police abuse. The third part will assess 
the relationship between police and youth in the 1980s and 1990s, when second and 
third generations of immigrant youth first reacted to the issue of police violence. The 
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fourth part will analyse a political move to the right in the early 2000s that served to 
increase already existing tension between youth and authorities. Lastly, the chapter 
will assess individual experiences in Lyon, which confirm grievances based on police 
interactions.  
 
An overview of the 2005 riots
5
 
In Clichy-sous-Bois, on the northern outskirts of Paris, three boys of Mauritanian and 
Tunisian background were participating in a soccer match on the 27
th
 of October 
2005. On their way home after the game, they spotted the police Anti-Crime Brigade 
(BAC). According to one of the boys questioned later, they decided to run to avoid a 
lengthy identity check and questioning, which are routinely experienced by ethnic 
youth, and which can lead to detention at the police station for up to four hours (The 
New York Times, 7
th
 November 2005). Trying to find a place to hide from the BAC, 
they climbed into an electricity substation. Once inside, one of the boys accidentally 
hit the transformer, killing the other two boys instantly. The third boy, badly burned, 
eventually found his way out. Later evidence showed that the police had seen the 
youth escape to the substation, but failed to make a simple call to the power company 
to shut the site down, a call which would have saved the boys‟ lives (Schneider 2008: 
135).  Instead, the police on duty commented “[…] their skin is worth nothing now” 
(police radio transcript, quoted in ibid.). 
 
For Sarkozy, the situation was clear – since the boys were running away from the 
police, they must have committed a crime (ibid.). Just two days earlier he had 
promised to power hose the local youth, or “scum” as he called them, out of a poor 
                                                 
5
 The events in Paris are largely adapted from the accounts of Schneider (2008), with additional sources 
which will be cited 
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Parisian neighbourhood. In addition, police denied having chased the youth, arguing 
the boys must have misunderstood their intent (Agence France-Presse, 1
st
 November 
2005). As word spread amongst the neighbourhood‟s residents, a series of small 
clashes broke out in Clichy-sous-Bois, followed the next day by a peaceful march by 
hundreds of residents of the area wearing t-shirts saying “Dead for Nothing” (Agence 
France Presse, 31
st
 October, 2005). On the same night, police threw a teargas canister 
towards a local mosque where a number of boys were hiding from the police – again, 
Sarkozy denied that the police had done anything wrong (Schneider 2008: 135).  
 
From this point, the riots spread around Paris and to nearly 300 cities and towns 
across France, including Lyon, where youths set fire to cars and engaged in clashes 
with police. Lyon was one of the cities hit hardest by violence, as clashes spread from 
the banlieues to the city centre (The Guardian, 13
th
 November 2005). Whilst some 
French commentators blamed the spread of the riots to copycat actions encouraged by 
sensational international media coverage, this chapter will argue that Lyon‟s ethnic 
youth minority identified through personal experience with the events in Paris, 
leading them to riot. 
 
The North African immigrant community and the police in Lyon – a long history of 
tensions 
 
The relationship between Lyon‟s immigrant community and the police has been a 
tenuous one almost from its beginning. Like other European countries, France has 
been obliged to import labour from abroad for economic and demographic reasons 
(Grillo 2006: 30) with Lyon becoming one of the main destinations for migrants 
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(Lewis 2007: 33-34). Settlement took place outside the city centre in today‟s 
banlieues, where the foreign population grew rapidly. The foreign population in 
Vaulx-en-Velin, for example, rose from virtually zero in 1901, to a population of 48% 
in 1931 (ibid).  
 
Whilst Lyon showed little interest in immigration control during the years of the 
economic boom, the depression in the 1930s rapidly changed this situation 
(Rosenberg 2006: 41-42). Expulsions, relatively rare in the 1920s, were normally 
caused by crimes that threatened the safety of people or their property. However, in 
the 1930s a shift occurred towards targeting the “surplus” population, so that petty 
crimes became a basis for expulsion (Lewis 2008: 261). Importantly, it was the police 
that had the key role in deciding who was expelled, highlighted by a quote from a 
newspaper at that time: “In a real Republic, expulsions would only be issued by a 
competent court after an investigation of both sides. But in our bourgeois anti-
Republic, expulsion is by fiat, it is a police measure.” (L’Humanité 1920, quoted in 
Lewis 2007: 42).  
 
As has been pointed out by Lewis (ibid.), only a few repatriates had been convicted of 
crimes, most instead being deported after large-scale raids for issues such as 
“vagrancy” - as police had substantial room to interpret their powers of repatriation. 
Due to their status as colonial subjects, North African immigrants in Lyon became 
increasingly vulnerable, as they had no diplomatic representation. According to 
Rosenberg (2006: 166), the fear of falling into the hands of the police dominated the 
lives of North African migrants. Although this clearly predates the 2005 riots, it 
highlights an important point, namely, the overlapping of ordinary police work such 
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as crime control with the issue of immigration. As will be shown later in this chapter, 
this is a link which continues to be of importance in modern day France, and which 
opens up issues of racial stereotyping in everyday police work in Lyon.  
 
The French-Algerian War from 1954-1962 left another imprint on the relations 
between police and North African migrants. While France was engaged in fighting 
overseas to secure its colonial belongings, the large number of Algerian migrants in 
France found themselves in a tenuous situation, being increasingly viewed with 
suspicion as potential traitors. This caused deep rifts in French society still visible 
today (McCormack 2011: 1131). According to Roach (1985: 111-112) and Silverstein 
(2010: 149) this situation, combined with the activities of the Algerian National 
Liberation Front (F.L.N.), led to heavy handed policing, which, whilst ostensibly 
aimed at breaking down the nationalist movement, had an extremely negative affect 
on ordinary North African men and women. Data on this, especially in English, is 
virtually non-existent. However, after long silence, French authorities have 
acknowledged that a massacre of about 200 French Algerian protestors took place in 
Paris in October 1961 (McCormack 2011: 1130). This illustrates the amount of 
brutality, which was deemed acceptable by authorities against French Algerians 
during the course of the war. Whilst an event of such scale does not seem to have 
occurred in Lyon, it highlights the tensions which must have been felt by the city‟s 
large population of North African immigrants and their children. 
 
Immigrant mobilisation and riots in the 1980s and 1990s 
Violence against the immigrant community on this scale is without doubt 
unacceptable today in France; however the issue of police brutality and targeting of 
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immigrants has not disappeared over the years and continues to be a source of tension. 
Actions taken by immigrant youth in Lyon in the early 1980s and 1990s provide an 
important insight into how pressure has continued since the collapse of France‟s 
colonies.  
 
From 1980 to 1985, no less than 46 people were killed by the police in suspicious 
circumstances, with another seven being seriously injured. Three of these incidents 
took place in Lyon, all involving members of the ethnic minority community (A 
Toutes les Victimes Online; based on excerpts from Rajsfus 2002).
6
 Out of all 
incidents, about three quarters were either second generation immigrant youths from 
the banlieues, or first generation migrants from North Africa. Compared with an 
estimated population of about 5-7%, this gives the impression that police were more 
willing to use excessive force against people with a foreign background.  
 
Further, there have been few sanctions applied to police involved in such actions. In 
Lyon, 25 year old Ahmed Boutelja was shot dead by police in September 1982 and 
although charged with murder, the police officer responsible only received a 5 year 
suspended sentence (ibid.). A protest by Boutelja‟s family and friends outside the 
courthouse ended with the police firing teargas and beating them with batons. Another 
policeman, charged with murder for the shooting of Mohamed Abidou in Lyon in 
November 1982, was acquitted after pressure from the police union, whilst a third 
policeman was acquitted after shooting Norreddine Babas in the back while he was 
caught stealing.  
 
                                                 
6
 This relates to instances which have been made public, actual numbers are suspected to be much 
higher, especially in terms of injuries 
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Beyond police brutality, ethnic minority youth in Lyon have also had to deal with 
everyday cases of police discrimination. An example of this is the checking of identity 
cards in Lyon in areas such as cafes (Grillo 2006: 61). Groups of immigrants have 
also been rounded up for ID checks in social situations, such as ski trips (ibid.). As 
such, there was a constant feeling of being „singled out‟, based on skin colour. In 
1982, 58% of minors in detention in Lyon were of foreign origin (Fysh et al 2003: 
161). In addition, a study of youth delinquency in Lyon from 1978 to 1981 showed 
that incidents involving French youth were more likely to be filed without further 
action (32%) compared to 25% of cases involving immigrants (Carr-Hill 1987: 296).  
 
Whereas the first generation of migrants have kept relatively silent about these issues, 
the 1980s have seen large mobilisations by their children against racism in France, 
and more specifically against police racism and brutality. Lyon became one of the 
main centres of protest in France with the founding of a number of initiatives and 
organisations seeking to protest and influence the actions of the authorities and the 
police. Rock against Police, Za’ama d’Banlieue, and the 1983 March for Equality and 
against Racism (March des Beurs) best illustrate how an oppressive structure has led 
to the formation of protest within the banlieues of Lyon. 
 
Rock against Police, which has been adopted from the British “Rock against Racism” 
concerts, was a series of concerts organised in the banlieues of Lyon, Paris and 
Marseille in 1980 and 1981; founded in response to three separate incidents in which 
young men were shot dead by the police  under dubious circumstances in just three 
weeks (Hargreaves 2007: 132). That the focus was on the police rather than racism 
more broadly reflects the specific conflict between the police and the banlieue youth 
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(Fysh et al 2003: 164). Similarly, Za’ama d’Banlieue was an organisation founded by 
young women of Maghrebi origin, whose campaigns mainly centred on unfair 
treatment by the police and the justice system. The movement gained large influence 
among the Arab community in Lyon‟s suburbs, culminating in a large scale 
demonstration against a visit by right-wing Front National (FN) leader Le Pen in 1984 
(Fysh et al 2003: 165). However, efforts to organise into a broader movement proved 
unsuccessful and while some smaller and local events against police brutality 
continued to exist, they remained unorganised and failed to take a political role (ibid.).  
 
While these initiatives were trying to influence the behaviour of police and authorities 
through activism, Lyon was simultaneously seeing the first outbreak of clashes 
between ethnic minority youth and police, albeit on a smaller scale than was 
witnessed in 2005.
7
 The first riot which is documented took place in September 1979, 
in the banlieue of Vaulx-en-Velin and like 2005 it was triggered by an instance 
involving the police. In this case, riots broke out after the public arrest of a local 
young man who was led off in handcuffs in order to be deported. Shocked friends and 
neighbours witnessing the incident saw the police as “conquerors” of their area 
(Willaume 2003: 13). Clashes with the police and the residents followed; however 
this incident received little local or national attention. 
 
This changed with the so-called „Hot Summer‟ of 1981.8 Rather than conventional 
riots, the 1981 summer gave witness to „joy-riding‟ activities by local adolescents, 
which involved stealing expensive cars in the city-centre and using them for races or 
                                                 
7
 In fact, Lyon was the first city in France to witness riots by ethnic minority youth with French 
citizenship (Jobard 2009: 27) 
8
 The Minguettes is a housing estate located in the eastern outskirts of Lyon in the banlieue of 
Vénissieux  
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for chases with the police, after which the cars would then be set on fire (Jobard 2009: 
28). During the course of the summer, about 250 cars had been burnt in Lyon in a 
number of different areas. Local media, the opposition and ordinary citizens applied 
for the local council to take action, however it was the national Socialist government 
which ended up taking action. They implemented a national urban policy for the 
country‟s most troubled neighbourhoods, with Lyon‟s suburbs becoming one of the 
key priorities for reform (Le Galès 1994: 114).  
 
Whilst these reforms focused on tackling a number of important issues faced by the 
youth in the banlieues in Lyon (increased funding for education, employment 
programs, physical renovation of rundown housing estates) the reforms did not extend 
to a re-evaluation of the relationship between immigrant youth and the police (ibid., 
Epstein 2009: 126). This was a major oversight considering the fact that this was a 
major source of discontent. Whilst some of the banlieues of Lyon were transformed 
into models of “urban renovation” (Le Galès 1994: 115), a significant part of the 
problem remained unaddressed.  
 
Indeed, rather than addressing the issue, political developments following the election 
of Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister in 1985 further increased the tension between 
youth and police. Immediately after his appointment as the new Interior Minister, 
Charles Pasqua proposed that “decisions regarding expulsion from the country be 
taken not by the judiciary, but by local prefects [of police]”, with the promise 
immigrants would be “deported in train loads” (quoted in Schneider 2008: 144). A 
focus on the connection between immigration and police work was further enhanced 
by a Bill passed in Parliament in the summer of 1993, which included the powers to 
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stop and search people who are suspected of being in France illegally (Beck et al 
1998: 415-416). As has been pointed out by Beck et al (ibid. 416), a focus on illegal 
immigration in everyday police work equates to racial profiling, as judgement for the 
crime (illegal immigration) is made on appearance and colour of the individual. This 
presents a continuation of earlier practices, when decisions to deport people were 
made by the police, increasing the vulnerability of immigrants. Within this context, it 
is easy to see how immigrants would view the police as a threat rather than a social 
service.  
 
These changes can be seen as directly increasing the tension between the police and 
immigrant youth, resulting in the increased frequency of clashes between the two 
parties in Lyon.  In addition to a number of smaller clashes, the city saw four large 
scale riots in the 1990s, each triggered by a police killing. In October 1990, riots 
erupted between hundreds of youths and the police after a local 21 year old died in a 
motorbike accident. Witnesses to the accident reported that the police deliberately cut 
off the rider‟s path, causing him to fatally collide with the police car (The Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution, 8
th
 October 1990). Interviews conducted with the rioting youth 
by journalists highlighted grievances surrounding identity checks, police harassment 
and deaths involving the police (ibid; Reuters News 8
th
 October 1990). Riots erupted 
again in October 1990 after police shot dead an 18 year old local youth of Moroccan 
origin, who tried to circumvent a police roadblock (Reuters News, 11
th
 October 
1992); in October 1995 after the killing of a local man suspected of being a terrorist 
(The Globe and the Mail, 10
th
 October 1995); and again in December 1997, after a 
youth was shot accidentally by a police officer playing with his gun in the local 
station (The Guardian 20
th
 December 1997).  
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In all of the cases above (with the exception of the 1997 shooting), the police faced 
few sanctions for their actions. The police‟s position under the control of the Minister 
of Interior, has largely allowed it to be shielded from criticism or inquiry, an issue 
which has long been highlighted by Amnesty International (1994). Instead, the 
continuing outbreak of riots has led to further securitization and an increased police 
presence in the banlieues, with thousands of additional CRS special riot police added 
to the forces (Silvestein 2010: 154). CRS troops are tasked with moving into the 
banlieues at the slightest sign of trouble, however due to their obvious appearance – 
caged vans and officers in full riot gear – they often exacerbate the situation rather 
than calming down tension (Mouhanna, quoted in Fessard 2011: 1). Whilst this move 
was complemented by the creation of a new policing arm, the police de proximité, or 
neighbourhood police, to foster better relationships with the French police and 
France‟s citizens in 1997 (ibid. 2), the move was not accompanied by any policy 
tackling any of the problems associated with police brutality or racial stereotyping.  
 
A focus on security and law and order in the 2000s 
In recent years, the continuation of riots has led to an increased focus of portraying 
the banlieues as lawless zones and as a “sign of France‟s post-modern crisis” 
(Levasseur 2010: 1). Indeed, rather than examining approaches of policing and the 
relationships between the police and ethnic youth, the focus in the first half of the 
2000s both in Lyon and France as a whole has been on increasing „security‟ and „law 
and order‟. The rise of the far-right in France seems to have played an important role 
in this. In the 2002 French Presidential elections, FN leader Le Pen made it into the 
final round, winning more votes than Jospin, the Socialist candidate. A look at the 
election statistics from 2002 shows that Lyon, as well as its banlieues, have equally 
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seen a large push to the right.
9
 In the first round, there was only one polling area in 
Lyon and the banlieues of Villeurbanne, Vénissieux and Bron (which are home to the 
largest ethnic minority communities in the area) in which the FN gathered under 10% 
of the vote. Rather, a result of around 20% was not unusual, in North-Vénissieux 
reaching as much as 24.7%.  
 
Body-Gendrot (2000: 220) illustrates how the strength of the far-right in Lyon has 
increased pressure on the local mayor to implement a tough stance on public disorder. 
For example, after a fight between two groups of youths in a Lyon suburb that 
resulted in the death of one man, police were immediately mobilised to combat fear of 
street crime. Further, Lyon was one of the only cities that voluntarily invested in 
cameras for police cars, which allow the police to take pictures of people while 
driving through a neighbourhood. It is likely that this further increases the feeling of 
surveillance and of the police as outsiders.  
 
On the national level, Sarkozy‟s appointment as Interior Minister led to changes in 
policing, which have affected youth all across France. Firstly, the policing of the 
banlieues became more centralised. On the one hand, Sarkozy put an end to the 
concept of neighbourhood police units, which he portrayed derogatorily as social 
workers (Mouhanna, quoted in Fessard 2011: 2). At the same time, difficult 
neighbourhoods and districts were put under the control of the CRS, a highly 
centralised riot police force, and the GIR, small specialised crime fighting units 
(Monjardet 2008: 48). As has been pointed out by Monjardet (ibid.), the central issue 
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 Available at the French Interior Ministry website, 
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is not that officers gain legitimacy by establishing relations with the public, but rather 
it is founded on the powers of constraint. In Sarkozy‟s words, “the best prevention is 
punishment” (quoted in Monjardet 2008: 42). This approach however is unlikely to 
ease tension in the banlieues. Rather, it has the effect that police and youth only 
interact when there is tension, rather than also having an opportunity for dialogue. 
 
Secondly, Sarkozy focussed on a „zero tolerance‟ approach to „quality of life crimes‟, 
such as defrauding public transport, begging and loitering in public (Waddington et al 
2009: 252). He further declared that all gatherings in the banlieues by young men 
were illegal (Schneider 2008: 148). Additional human and material resources 
(Monjardet 2008: 33), highlight the trend under Sarkozy of making the police more 
visible (Mitchell 2011: 416), with the goal to emphasise a police presence and come 
down hard on delinquents. These measurements have to be seen as an additional layer 
of discontent in the long history of police brutality and abuse which has been seen in 
earlier years. According to a 2005 newspaper article, the number of complaints 
against the police through law firms and initiatives in Lyon have increased 
substantially (Le Progrès, 9
th
 May 2005), highlighting further deteriorating 
relationships.  
 
Voices of grievance in Lyon 
 
Official data which could give an insight into the treatment of ethnic minority youth 
by the police in the lead up to the riots in Lyon is meagre. On the one hand, France 
does not collect data according to ethnic origin, or any data on issues such as stop and 
search procedures, as such collection is prohibited by law. Although such statistics do 
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not provide an objective picture of reality, it nevertheless provides important insights 
into the issue of differential treatment. In France, the absence of such data is 
especially problematic in light of broad police powers to carry out stop searches, even 
if there are no suspicious circumstances (Beck et al 1998: 408). This is exacerbated by 
the fact that the French police openly acknowledges that they do not stop and search a 
representative sample of the population (Body-Gendrot 2010: 663).  
 
Police statistics for individuals suspected of an offence broken up into the categories 
„French national‟ and „foreigner‟ do indeed seem to suggest that skin colour might 
play a role in everyday policing. From 1998 to 2004, 18.5 to 20 per cent of 
individuals suspected of an offence did not hold French citizenship (French Interior 
Ministry 2004: 63), yet this same group only constitutes 5.6% of the overall 
population (Zauberman et al 2003: 1074). Whilst some would argue that this 
difference simply reflects greater criminality on the part of foreigners (ibid. 1075), it 
does raise the question of racism in the police force, which in turn would likely extend 
to attitudes and behaviours to members of the ethnic minority community that actually 
hold French citizenship.  
 
In relation to Paris, scholars have undertaken research in the form of interviews and 
focus groups to gain a better understanding of the perception police and youth hold of 
each other (for example see Body-Gendrot 2008, Kokoreff 2009, Mouhanna 2009, 
Schneider 2008). These give important insights as they have highlighted mutual 
mistrust and suspicion, confessions of racial profiling on the side of the police and 
frustration on side of the youth. However, no similar studies seem to have been 
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conducted for Lyon or its surrounding suburbs. Nevertheless, unofficial accounts 
underline that the findings for Paris are likely to hold equally true for Lyon.  
 
In 2004, a spokesperson for an anti-discrimination group based in Lyon raised 
concerns about the issue of racial profiling (quoted in Open Society Justice Initiative 
2009: 48). In his words, police controls make life difficult for any foreigner without 
papers, or anyone who “is too black, too Arab, too tan, too stereotype, too young, too 
poor”. Police controls in Lyon are described as acts of public humiliation that are 
often arbitrary and brutal. In these acts, individuals are often made to lie on the 
ground or pushed against a wall (ibid.). This highlights the problem of combining 
everyday police work with a focus on targeting immigration, as has been discussed 
above, and shows that this seems to be a common feature in Lyon as well. The fact 
that such searches are viewed by the population as arbitrary is important, as this 
means the image of a police officer automatically evokes concern about an identity 
check. In addition, public acts of aggression such as pushing individuals against a 
wall or making them lie on the ground for the purpose of checking their papers 
impacts not only the individual in question, but also other who witness such incidents. 
 
The issue of police brutality in Lyon is further highlighted by a local website, called 
Témoins Lyon – „Witnesses Lyon‟ (temoinslyon.free.fr). It functions as a portal to 
denounce instances of police brutality and to make cases public. Information on 
particular cases does not date back very far, however an account of an instance of 
police brutality involving a woman of African background a few months before the 
2005 riots broke out gives a good example of the ready use of violence against people 
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with an immigrant background.
10
 Nadia Aggoune ended up at the police station one 
night to complain about a taxi driver. After asking the police if somebody could drive 
her home, because it was in the middle of the night, she was pushed away by a female 
officer with the words „go home now.‟ While falling to the ground, Nadia held on to 
the police woman. After this, she was severely beaten and kicked by a number of 
officers, had her head slammed against the wall and was held in custody for a total of 
14 hours. In the end, the police woman additionally sued her for insult. Incidents like 
this may act to encourage members of a minority not to voluntarily approach police. 
In turn, lack of contact between the two groups prevents the development of trust and 
dialogue and perpetuates mutual suspicion. 
 
Conclusion 
The key to understanding the 2005 riots in Lyon lies in making note of the violent 
harassment of the ethnic minority youth by the police. The deaths involving the two 
boys in Paris, followed by the denial of any wrong doing on part of the authorities 
highlighted to youth in Paris and Lyon alike that they were treated as second class 
citizens. Daily confrontation and police harassment have fostered this view for 
generations. The role of right-wing elements was absent in this, instead exercising 
pressure through the political arena.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Available at http://temoinslyon.free.fr/dotclear/index.php?2005/12/10/16-violences-policieres-couvertes-par-la-
justice-et-nouvelle-affaire-doutrage-et-rebellion  
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Chapter Five - 
The riots in Oldham and Lyon: impacts of the relationship between 
state and police 
 
According to Castles (1991: 1)(Castles 1991), without some kind of comparison, 
either cross-national or cross-temporal, it is impossible to characterise national 
experiences. As this chapter will show, analysing the riots in Oldham and Lyon in a 
comparative perspective greatly enhances an understanding of the dynamics 
underlying rioting behaviour in these two cities. As has been pointed out earlier, 
France and Britain are similar in many respects which has made them popular for 
comparison: they are both democracies and part of Western Europe; have similar 
population sizes; and have both been colonial powers, resulting in the influx of 
significant immigrant populations, many of whom experience socio-economic 
discrimination and live in ghetto-like conditions. However, they also differ in an 
important aspect: France is a centralised state, and Britain is not. Whereas France‟s 
police operates under the control of the Interior Minister, Britain‟s police force is 
decentralised and relatively independent (Lawday 2000).(Lawday 2001) This chapter 
will argue that this factor has been of primary importance in explaining differences in 
riot behaviour in Lyon and Oldham.  
 
This argument will be developed in two steps. Firstly, the underlying dynamics of the 
Lyon and Oldham riots, namely the role of violent and non-violent harassment and 
centralisation versus decentralisation of police forces, will be assessed.  Secondly, it 
will be assessed how these factors have impacted upon white communities, especially 
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right-wing elements, and why racist attacks were a factor of the Oldham riots, but not 
those in Lyon.  
 
The dynamics underlying the riots in Lyon and Oldham 
As has been established in the previous two chapters, the role of the police has been 
instrumental in the outbreak of riots in both Lyon and Oldham. In the case of Lyon, 
the police have engaged in violent forms of harassment, characterised by instances of 
police brutality, humiliating identity checks and oppressive forms of policing that 
serve to bring the police into constant confrontation with the ethnic minority youth. 
This violent harassment has led to the development of significant grievances, that the 
government have failed to address, leading to a reaction by the ethnic minority youth 
of Lyon. In Oldham on the other hand, issues such as police brutality and excessive 
use of force might have occurred on a smaller level, but were not common features of 
everyday interaction between police and Asian youth. Instead the relationship 
between the police and ethnic minority youth in Oldham was characterised by a non-
violent form of harassment, based around a strong focus on Asian gang violence and 
Asians as perpetrators. 
 
The relationship between the police and the state in the two countries has been highly 
influential in shaping this difference. Firstly, the organisation of the French police 
under the authority of the Interior Minister has largely shielded it from criticism. As 
has been pointed out by both Lawday (2000) and Zauberman and Lévy 
(2003),(Zauberman 2003) the police is first and foremost accountable to the French 
state, rather than to its citizens, enabling discrimination of ethnic minority youth and 
other members of the public. It is seen as the “protector of the state”, based on a long 
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history of popular uprisings in France (Lawday 2000: 5). As such, the relationship 
between the youth and police in Lyon has remained relatively unchanged over the 
years. This differs from the situation in Britain, where the police is largely 
independent from government and predominantly seen as service to the people and 
accountable to them (ibid.). The fact that the Greater Manchester Police was the first 
police force in Britain which decided to publish ethnic monitoring data for issues such 
as race hate crimes or stop searches (GMP 2002) (GMP 2002) shows that it is 
concerned with being perceived as accountable to all citizens. This means that violent 
forms of harassment as have been seen in France would not be tolerated on such as 
scale in Britain.  
 
The difference between a centrally controlled police force in France versus local 
divisions in the UK has highly impacted upon the underlying dynamics in the two 
cities. In Oldham, the strong focus on Asian gang violence and Asians as perpetrators 
was a decision taken by the local police division. As has been addressed above, the 
Oldham police force had a unique way of actively encouraging hate crime reports, as 
compared to other divisions in the Greater Manchester Police Force, and made use of 
this data with little criticism about its validity. This reflects the room for independent 
actions by police divisions, which contrasts starkly with the French police, being 
tightly connected to the government. As may be recalled, Sarkozy fired a popular 
Toulon police chief for organising football matches with local youth – exemplifying 
that he did not tolerate any divergence from his overall hardline approach. In Lyon, 
the sources of grievances on part of the youth are highly connected to these decisions 
taken on the national level, as they enable violence and harassment against ethnic 
minorities in Lyon. On the one hand, the police fulfils a political role with the 
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targeting of illegal immigration, leading to increased racial profiling (Beck et al 1998: 
415-416),(Beck 1998) and on the other, as has been addressed above, abuse hardly 
ever has consequences. In addition, the confrontation between youth and police within 
Lyon is often not with local police officers, but with highly centralised units such as 
the undercover BAC or the CRS riot police, which only have contact with the youth 
when there is tension. As such, the nature of the grievances on part of the youth is not 
so much the Lyon police, as the police per se.  
 
This seems to be vindicated by extending the focus to other riots that have taken place 
in the two countries – which shows that while in France the trigger moment always 
shows relatively similar characteristics, they are more diverse in Britain. As has been 
highlighted, Lyon has seen numerous riots during the 1990s, always triggered by an 
instance of police brutality. This seems to hold true also for riots in Paris over the last 
years (Schneider 2008), as well as the most recent riot in Villiers-le-Bel in 2007, 
which was triggered by the deaths of two boys involving an accident with a police car. 
This differs to riots which erupted in Britain. First of all, they are rarer. Secondly, 
whereas riots such as those in Birmingham and Burnley in 2001 have shown similar 
characteristics to the riots in Oldham, the most recent example in Tottenham has been 
triggered by the shooting of a local youth and the disregard of a local protest 
organised by the community later on, similar to riots which broke out in Britain in the 
1980s. As such, in France, the outbreak of riots seems to always follow a similar 
pattern. This pattern however is more diverse in Britain, pointing to a stronger role of 
the decisions made by the different divisions, as has also been seen in the case of 
Oldham.  
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The role of the white community 
 
In turn, these two factors (non-violent versus violent and local versus national police 
decision dynamics) have impacted upon the role of the white community, and in 
particular the right-wing elements, in the Lyon and Oldham riots. In Lyon, the white 
community has not exercised an obvious role, with confrontation being limited to the 
police and ethnic minority youth. In Oldham however, the right-wing attacks have 
played a fundamental part in the outbreak of the riots, further highlighting to the 
Asian community that the police did not provide protection which in turn triggered 
the riots. It is argued here that the non-violent and violent modes of confrontation 
between police and ethnic minority youth have fundamentally affected this difference. 
 
In Oldham, the role of non-violent harassment was critical. Firstly, non-violent 
harassment served to alienate the Asian population of Oldham. Secondly, the fact that 
non-violent harassment is much less visible than violent harassment impacted the 
perception of the far-right movement. In Lyon, the policy of violent harassment was 
extremely visible, highlighted in the case study by anecdotes of visible police 
presence, stop searches and presence of armed BAC and CRS units on the street. Non-
violent harassment, by definition though, is much less obvious and visible. Whilst it is 
felt by the minority who is being harassed, the majority not subject to the harassment 
are unlikely to perceive its existence. As such, police discussion of Asian violence 
and Asian gangs served to increase fear amongst the white community (Ray et al 
2004: 685)(L. a. D. S. Ray 2004), and lack of noticeable aggression on the police‟s 
behalf led the white community to believe that they were not being protected. In turn, 
a paradox of sorts emerged, whereby the Asian community felt harassed and the white 
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community felt that not enough action was being taken. This served to create a space 
into which the nationalist far right movement could take action on the streets and 
partake in violent confrontations under the banner of protecting their communities. 
 
In Lyon on the other hand, violent harassment on part of the police against ethnic 
minority youth and presence on the streets had satisfied right-wing groups not to 
engage in large scale physical action in the way that occurred in Oldham. A 
newspaper search of French and English newspapers for the 12 months predating the 
riots in Lyon has shown that small right-wing demonstrations in Lyon occurred, 
especially in front of the Turkish Embassy, however no record of violent 
confrontation could be found. Instead, the right wing has exercised pressure through 
the political arena, predominantly at the national level. As has been assessed in the 
previous chapter, the NF was successful in exercising pressure on the national 
political discourse, as has been highlighted by Sarkozy‟s strong stance on law and 
order. In turn, this did not take the form of active confrontation with immigrant youth 
in the streets, and as such explains the absence right-wing extremists groups in the 
outbreak of the riots in Lyon.  
 
In conclusion, the relationship between the state and the police force - manifested in a 
centralised system under the control of the Interior Minister largely shielded from 
critique in France and in a decentralised and more independent policing system in 
Britain - has played a major role in influencing the reactions of extremists in both 
Lyon and Oldham. In Oldham, the non-violent form of harassment of the ethnic 
community has opened up space for right-wing elements to “function as police 
officers”, culminating into riots. In Lyon on the other hand, the relationship between 
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state and police has sanctioned violent harassment of young people of immigrant 
decent, in turn leading to riots without the direct involvement of right-wing 
extremists. Rather, pressure was asserted through political channels, predominantly 
the national arena in turn increasing pressure.  
 
It is not claimed that these are the only factors that have influenced rioting behaviour 
in the two cities. There are potentially other factors which have influenced the 
absence of the role of the right on the streets in Lyon. For example this might relate to 
differences in segregation, which provide the right wing with fewer opportunities to 
come into contact and clash with ethnic minority youth. Further, the size and growing 
popularity of the FN, decreases the freedom with which it can act. Having to maintain 
an appearance of being respectable, credible and electable party, FN supporters have 
less ability to take their grievances to the streets or to manifest them in violent 
confrontation as was the case by BNP supporters in Oldham. Nevertheless it seems to 
provide insights into why right-wing elements have been involved in the case of 
Oldham, culminating in riots.  
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Chapter Six - 
A local outlook: The role of dialogue between police and youth 
 
The previous chapters have shown that the police played a key role in the riots in 
Oldham and Lyon, and that the different relationship between the state and the police 
force, one being the protector of the state and the other one a service to the people, 
can explain why right-wing fractions have arisen. This chapter will address the issue 
of neighbourhood policing, and especially the role of dialogue, as an alternative to the 
policing methods applied in both cities. It will examine how dialogue has been 
successfully used in the suburb of Kreuzberg in Berlin Germany in circumstances 
analogous to those in Oldham and Lyon. The successful implementation of the 
approach in Kreuzberg, serves as an interesting case to show how a city has moved 
towards more local and dialogue based approaches post conflict. 
 
The ambiguity surrounding the concept of neighbourhood policing  
 
In both Oldham and Lyon, communication and trust between the police forces and 
ethnic minority youth were distinctly lacking and played an instrumental role in the 
outbreak of the riots. In both cases the ethnic minority youth were to some extent seen 
as a threat which has had to be addressed. In Lyon, the ethnic minority youth was seen 
as a threat to public order, and in the case of Oldham, the threat originated from the 
idea of Asian gang violence. The problem with this lack of communication and 
understanding is that it creates tension and mistrust on both sides: ethnic youth do not 
see the police as a “public service” and react antagonistically to it, while police are 
often afraid to enter certain parts of neighbourhoods for fear of violence (Mouhanna 
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2009: 174). This situation creates a vicious cycle – leading to even more oppressive 
and distant methods of policing and greater backlash by youths (ibid.). France‟s 
heavily centralised policing system is especially problematic, as units such as the CRS 
do not have any contact with the youth other than in times of tension. Although 
Oldham‟s police force was more localised, based on a history of “the bobby on the 
beat” in Britain (Lawday 2000), the view was expressed by residents that the police 
either did not consult people to find out their concerns, or consulted „elders‟ which 
were not representative of the community, particularly of the youth (Oldham 
Independent Review 2001: 78). In addition, Asians felt unfairly targeted. As such, 
dialogue in both cities was missing.  
 
This highlights the importance of a more localised or neighbourhood policing 
approach involving communication and interaction between the different groups. 
However there is ambiguity surrounding this concept and the expectations which are 
placed on it, which can be exemplified by the history of community policing in 
France. In the 1990s, community policing was implemented in France to address the 
“divide between France and its police” (Fessard 2011). The policy focused on 
assigning police officers to certain areas to increase familiarity with the environment 
and its residents. In addition, police patrolled their areas by foot to increase the ability 
to actually enter into dialogue and relationships with the local populace (Chelini et al 
2011). However, rising crime rates and lack of immediate results led Sarkozy to 
denounce neighbourhood officers as “social workers” as soon as he became Interior 
Minister under Chirac in 2002 (Mouhanna, in interview with Fessard 2011). Having 
concluded that the system did not produce satisfactory results, Sarkozy put an end to 
community policing, despite its apparent popularity with the general population 
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(ibid.). In addition, Sarkozy fired a popular Toulon police chief for working with 
neighbourhood youths (Schneider 2008: 148), underlining his message that “the 
police do not exist for the purpose of organising sporting tournaments, but for 
arresting delinquents” (quoted in Chelini et al 2011).  
 
When assessing the success of the community policy program, a number of factors 
must be taken into account. Firstly, units such as the BAC and CRS continued to 
operate according to their highly confrontational principles. Indeed, as Schneider 
(2008: 147) points out community policing groups in France were supplementary to 
and had no impact on regular police and special units. Amnesty International (1994) 
reports highlight police mistreatment and deaths in custody during the period, often 
involving plain clothes BAC officers or the CRS. As such, any in roads made by 
community officers with ethnic youth can be seen as being undone by the 
perpetuation of the key problem in the system. 
 
As such, „the failure‟ of community policing might not so much relate to the nature of 
community policing itself, but rather to the static structure around it. As has been 
pointed out by Mouhanna (interview with Fessard 2011), the combination of a soft 
local approach and a disconnected hard-line approach is not coherent. The local 
contacts should instead be used to influence a more targeted approach by units such as 
the BAC. As such, although community policing is not a silver-bullet solution in 
itself, it seems to be the first step in building better relations between ethnic minority 
youth and the police and should be utilised by more centralised units, potentially 
diminishing the likelihood of riots.  
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Police reforms after clashes between police and youth in Kreuzberg 
 
The police in Berlin is characterised by highly localised structures, developed after 
the reunification of West and East Berlin after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
11
 The city is 
divided into six divisions, each covering one to three suburbs, and each headed by its 
own chief who answers to the head of the Berlin police. These six divisions are 
further split into 38 areas in which 150 teams are assigned to a particular location. As 
has been stressed on the police‟s website, this structure is aimed at developing strong 
ties of identification of the police officers with their specific locations and its 
residents.  
 
Despite this approach, clashes broke out in the suburb of Kreuzberg in November 
2006 between the police and local youth, the majority of whom had Turkish 
backgrounds. According to police accounts, officers were confronted by a number of 
young men as they arrested two boys for stealing an MP3 player earlier in the day. 
After they called for reinforcement, fights erupted between the police and about 80 to 
100 youths (Focus 2006). However, similar to incidents in Lyon and Oldham, the 
accounts of residents differed from police accounts. According to Der Spiegel (2006), 
a number of older residents who witnessed the clash, of both Turkish and German 
origin, argued that the police were acting unreasonably during the arrest. Apparently, 
officers approached the two boys, who were only twelve years old, with weapons and 
batons drawn, and put them into handcuffs. A 23 year old confronted the police, 
saying: “You are all the same, just because you are wearing uniforms, you act like 
you can do anything.” To this, one officer answered: “Go back from where you came 
                                                 
11
 Information concerning the police structure in Berlin has been obtained from the police‟s website, 
available at http://www.berlin.de/polizei/index.html and http://www.berlin.de/polizei/bezirk/index.html  
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from, Germany is not for you.” Residents say that the heavy handed response and 
racist remarks acted as the event that sparked the riot which followed.   
 
Whilst the actions of the police in Kreuzberg are remarkably similar to the situations 
in both Oldham and Lyon, the Kreuzberg‟s police‟s response after the riots stands in 
marked contrast. Firstly, mediating talks between the police and the affected youth, 
including the 23 year old man who stepped in during the arrest, were immediately 
initiated to de-escalate the situation (Lukas 2009: 224, Berliner Zeitung 22
nd
 
November  2006). Despite Berlin‟s localised approach, it appeared that patrols in 
Kreuzberg were conducted by officers who were not familiar with the area, leading 
police chiefs to put in place new guidelines so that police officers who do not know 
the area will be exposed and sensitised to its particularities (Lukas 2009: 225). 
Secondly, Berlin additionally implemented „contact area officers‟, the now smallest 
statistical units in Berlin (Lukas 2007: 4). Distressed areas in Berlin are staffed by two 
to three officers, who possess excellent communication skills, and who walk through 
the areas serving as a contact person for the residents‟ problems and concerns.  
 
Importantly, the response of the Kreuzberg police acknowledged that there was an 
underlying problem in the interaction between the police and the youths. Unlike both 
Oldham and Lyon, the Kreuzberg police addressed this source of tension as the key 
factor in the outbreak of the clash. The absence of any large scale riots in Berlin, 
despite a range of social problems analogous to the case studies examined in this 
thesis such as higher unemployment, economic deprivation, socio-spatial segregation, 
employment discrimination and political marginalisation, seems to point to the 
validity of this approach (Lukas 2007, 2009).  
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Neighbourhood policing in France and Britain 
Engaging into dialogue with the youth involved in conflict differs strongly from the 
approach taken in Lyon (and France in general), where the voice of the banlieue youth 
was glaringly absent in any form of discussion after the riots in 2005. In reality, the 
question about the role of the police itself was absent too. Similarly, although Oldham 
issued reports into the reasons underlying the riots, there was no direct dialogue 
between youth and police officers, and a lot of the work focussed on structural 
problems such as segregation. 
In France, the concept of neighbourhood policing units remains to be viewed with 
suspicion. Concepts of dialogue and accommodation seem to be incongruent with the 
larger state philosophy of the police as an agent to protect the state. Although 
community policing was  reintroduced in 2010 with the creation of the Special 
Ground Brigades (Brigades Spéciales de Terrain – BST), the focus of these units has 
been on getting „tougher‟ and more focused on the control of „territory‟ and 
prevention of crime, as opposed to the formation of community relationships and 
development of community dialogue (Liberation 2010). Similar to Sarkozy in 2002, 
the current Interior Minister has argued that the BST are not social workers (quoted in 
ibid.). Indeed, the idea of dialogue and increasing trust and ties with the community 
does not seem to feature prominently. 
Oldham has not implemented any direct changes to the structure of policing after the 
riots, however the traditional role of neighbourhood policing is much stronger in 
Britain than it is in France (Lawday 2000). That this concept continues to be valued 
can be seen by the introduction of Community Support Officers across Britain, 
including Oldham, as a result of the Police Reform Act in 2002. These community 
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support officers are part of a local policing team and have the task of providing 
reassurance to their local communities and addressing specific local issues (Clements 
2008: 133). 
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Conclusion 
A range of approaches have been used to understand the causes of riots, 
encompassing factors such as social disadvantage or failure to integrate. However, 
whilst socio-economic conditions might be regarded as necessary conditions, they 
were not enough by themselves to provoke the riots in either Lyon or Oldham. 
Instead, this thesis has shown that both riots were provoked first and foremost by the 
role of the police. The key to understanding rioting behaviour in Lyon and Oldham is 
the relationship the police has with the state in both France and Britain.  
 
In both cities, ethnic minority youth were subject to police harassment. However, the 
nature of this harassment differed between the two cities. In Lyon, ethnic minority 
youth were subject to violent harassment in the form of police brutality, numerous 
deaths at the hands of the police and aggressive use of stop and search procedures. In 
Oldham however, the ethnic minority youth were subject to non-violent harassment. 
Examples of police brutality are rare in Oldham. Instead, the ethnic minority youth 
were harassed through a non-violent form, mainly by the police‟s focus on Asian gang 
violence.  
 
This thesis has argued that the reason that police employed different forms of 
harassment was due to their relationship with the state. In France, the police force is 
centralised and its key role is as protector of the state. This makes the police 
accountable to the state and positions it against the population. This relationship 
allowed the Minister of the Interior to shield the police from criticisms and legal 
action associated with claims of police brutality. On the other hand, Britain‟s police 
force is decentralised so that forces spread across the country are provided with the 
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freedom to adjust their policing strategies to the local environment. This relationship 
and proximity to the local population additionally makes the police more accountable. 
Indeed, examples of police brutality as experienced in France would be less likely to 
be tolerated in Britain.  
 
This structure has important ramifications for rioting in both countries. In France, the 
policing approach used in Lyon is replicated across the country, increasing the 
chances of aggressive policing giving rise to grievances amongst ethnic youth leading 
to more wide spread rioting. In Britain on the other hand, the policing policies in 
Oldham can be seen as being unique to the location and are not necessarily 
reproduced in the same way elsewhere in the country.  
 
The second question that this thesis set out to answer was why the composition of the 
riots in Lyon and Oldham differed. In Oldham, ethnic minority youth clashed with the 
police and right-wing extremists, whereas in Lyon clashes were limited to the police 
and the ethnic minority youth. This thesis has shown that this was also a result of the 
nature of the harassment applied in both cities, leading back to the different 
relationship between state and police. In Oldham, the police‟s use of non-violent 
harassment was less visible to the wider community. This created a situation in which 
the white population felt that the police was not doing enough to protect them from 
Asian gang violence, a perception heightened by the police‟s public focus on race 
related crime statistics. This served to create a space in which right-wing groups could 
confront ethnic minority youth under the banner of neighbourhood protection. 
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On the other hand, the French police‟s use of violent harassment in Lyon was 
extremely visible, in effect satisfying right-wing groups that the police were doing 
their job, reducing the need and ability of these groups to enter into the mix. Instead, 
right wing activity shifted to the political arena, predominantly at the national level 
exercising pressure in that sphere.  
 
This thesis has therefore raised an important issue relating to the strategies that the 
police apply to ethnic minority youth. A clear commonality between both cities is that 
the ethnic minority youth were seen as a threat, which created a vicious cycle: 
policing was increased, the aggressiveness of policing increased, creating grievances 
amongst ethnic youth, who responded by confronting the symbol of their grievances: 
the police. This in turn led to increased policing. Chapter Five of this thesis provides a 
third option for police strategy: neighbourhood policing. It argues that if police can 
build relationships and dialogue with the local population, they are more likely to 
remove the source of tension. Further, these relationships provide a channel beyond 
rioting to redress grievances. The success of the neighbourhood policing model in 
Kreuzberg to diffuse stand-offs between the police and the local ethnic minority youth 
highlights the efficacy of this model.  
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